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### CAPABILITIES APPROACH AND THE MARXIST INTERPRETATION OF THE POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE. REFLECTIONS ON THE AFTER-WAR RESTORATION OF UKRAINE<sup>1</sup>

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*Marxism as a normative position is critical of liberalism. However, the problems of justice and alienation that Marxism draws attention to can be solved by liberalism without the implementation of a Marxist political project. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the thesis that Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach (one of the versions of political liberalism) is a more inclusive and rational method of theorizing about the basic principles of justice than Marxism. By analyzing Elizabeth Anderson's theory of liberal egalitarianism "democratic equality", I show that some of Marxist approaches that (1) do not deny the existence of justice and (2) are concerned with the problem of alienation, can apply the arsenal of the moral theory of political liberalism to solve these problems. I also criticize Rawls's and Nussbaum's theories of political liberalism for their procedural vagueness and non-inclusive theory of justice. I present an outline of my position, which I propose to call «extended political liberalism» (hereafter EPL). EPL is currently represented by two arguments: 1) the paideia argument and 2) the argument of the interdependence of the good and the right. The first allows talking about the actual implementation of basic rights and freedoms only when citizens are aware of them and have the opportunity to change their views regarding the personal conception of the good. This is impossible without qualitative basic education. Also, one of the central concepts of EPL is presented within the framework of Paideia's argument - the interpretation of the political conception of justice. Because of this concept, it makes sense to talk about the possibility of citizens' reflection on the reconciliation of the current political conception with the personal conception of the good. This can also*

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*be done through the analysis of other conceptions of the good. The second argument is a continuation of the first, appearing as a theoretical mechanism that allows supplementing the existing political conception in case of serious social changes. In conclusion, if we take into account the advantages of the capabilities approach and my criticism of its weaknesses, then a theoretical position will emerge that is quite acceptable to some representatives of Marxism. Moreover, the latter will not have to give up their basic beliefs. The peculiarity of my concept presented in this text is that it is not so much a critique of Marxism as an analysis of the basic normative judgments of political liberalism, with which some Marxists can agree. With this article, I also want to illustrate the strengths of such a concept and point to its prospects for further attempts to interpret the political conception by other normative positions.*

**Keywords:** *political liberalism, Marxism, democratic equality, distributive justice, capability theory.*

## Introduction

After the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war, so the victory of Ukraine and the defeat of Russia, the question of recovery and reconstruction will be crucial for Ukrainian society. From now on, one sees that the Ukrainians show a very high level of social and political consolidation, and nowadays their most common emotion is pride for their country.<sup>2</sup> As far as the people still could remain consolidated after the war and will continue to show big trust in the state, the justification and the basic principles of the restoration strategies will be at stake of the political competition among Ukrainian political parties in the future.

Different political forces can propose a variety of ideological optics for post-war reconstruction. Given that the Ukrainian political scene is very diverse and parties' political programs are vague, I suppose it is much more realistic and useful to focus on the justification of basic political principles that the majority can accept. So the consensus is what should be sought. Because questions concerning it are so complex that even small mistakes can cost too much in the future. It is important for every Ukrainian citizen not only because it concerns reparations that Russian should pay, but also Ukraine's debts to its allies. The question of how to pay these debts justly should be the primary task for the government to communicate with citizens.

**My aim** is to show that throughout the framework of political liberalism - first described by Rawls and then developed by other philosophers - it is possible to present on the abstract level, the arguments for general consensus that liberals, Marxists, or conservatives would accept, and the majority of the citizens would support (Rawls, 2005). I want to convince the people for whom the question of justice and equality are important that they have much more in common than they think they have. So I will present arguments that state that the **capabilities approach can be presented as a Marxist interpretation of the political conception of justice**. So in this text, I want to show how people with Marxist views can accept and interpret

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<sup>2</sup> See *Seventeenth national survey: Identity. Patriotism. Values (August 17-18, 2022)*. Ukraine - Research (s.a.). Retrieved December 8, 2022, from: [https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/s\\_mnadcyate\\_zagalnonac\\_onalne\\_opituvannya\\_dentichn\\_st\\_patr\\_otizm\\_c\\_nmost\\_17-18\\_serpnya\\_2022.html](https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/s_mnadcyate_zagalnonac_onalne_opituvannya_dentichn_st_patr_otizm_c_nmost_17-18_serpnya_2022.html)

political liberalism in their own terms.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, I will consider not common Marxist claims, but very specific insights from Anderson's Marxist interpretation of Nussbaum's capability approach, which is one of the forms of political liberalism. I also think that it is better to exclude from the discussion the set of views that accept violence, radical redistribution of property, or xenophobia as a ways of political competition. These views cannot fit the normative requirement of seeking consensus and mutual tolerance.

The underlying values of political liberalism and Marxism are similar. They both are concerned with justice and equality. The other reason to choose Marxist arguments when discussing political liberalism is that Marxism is usually very insightful in addressing and explicating the social processes which help us to see the failures of capitalism. It can enrich our reflections on capitalism from the liberal point of view. I find this feature of Marxism very important. Nevertheless, I don't think that the further steps proposed by Marxists are reasonable such as the need to abandon capitalism and create new systems of people's cooperation.

I suppose that our aim should be not to remove capitalism but to try making it more fair. This is the primary task for liberalism when the obstruction of basic principles of justice is the case. I see the Russian-Ukrainian war which started in 2014 as a tremendous example of such an obstruction. While Russia had already annexed Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, many countries who presented themselves as the keepers of liberal values continued to trade with Russia and gain extra profit. Partially, the continuation of this outrageous process, even after the imposition of sanctions, allowed Russia to start a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.

In **Section 1**, I will give a very short historical overview of political liberalism. I will outline some recent developments in this theory. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the capability approach, justice as fairness, and Marxism are not mutually exclusive but share much in common. In **Section 2**, I will examine how Nussbaum's capability approach modifies Rawls's concept of justice as fairness. **Section 3** overviews Anderson's interpretation of the capability approach and how it exemplifies the Marxist interpretation of political conception of justice. Finally, in **Section 4**, I present my critical reassessment of Nussbaum's account of political liberalism considering Anderson's interpretation.

My account of political liberalism is still unclear, but for now, I will unite my arguments together by calling my position extended **political liberalism**. Its main aim is to show how a more inclusive account of political conception can meet the procedural requirements of political liberalism. It could be done by applying the **paideia argument** and the **argument about the interdependency of right and good**. Thus, the problems of Rawls's (non-inclusive political conception) and Nussbaum's

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<sup>3</sup> In this article I will not address the issue of how right-wing or neoliberal objections can be met in the framework of political liberalism. Still, this topic need to be covered as far as neoliberal reforms after the Revolution of Dignity (2013-2014) influenced Ukrainian political reality quite a bit.

(procedural vagueness) accounts of political liberalism can be solved through extended political liberalism. Hence, political liberalism in general becomes a more convincing position.

## 1. Political liberalism. Brief overview

I think any liberal political philosophy that uses rational arguments for self-justification and evaluation of the other positions is falling into a trap. One can easily distinguish the family of such theories from others that promote the state omnipotence and radical actions such as violence toward certain social groups. Usually, the latter never tries to present rational justifications. Political philosophies of this kind can be efficient in the sense of their utility, but their attitude toward basic entitlements remains unclear. How can one distinguish between the positions that accept the burden of judgment and rational proof? Furthermore, how is it possible to evaluate them?

What are the criteria for distinguishing good arguments from the best ones? I suggest that it can be achieved when the certain view not only tries to defend its position but leaves no alternative to its possible rivals but to accept. It looks more possible when a certain view presents the framework for the acceptance. In the case of Rawls's political liberalism, its main feature is that it provides a framework many could agree on (at least on the basic level) than something that concentrates only on obtrusive conviction. Its **main task** (so the **mine** in this article) is to provide individuals with the methods for explicating their basic convictions for the latter reflection about the possible consensus.

The comparison of political liberalism and Marxism is hardly original. Rawls already did it. When he wrote about Marx and the Marxist critique of liberalism, he always did that with great respect for the opponent's arguments. He tried finding the best in the position of the opponent and warned that «we must be careful here not to compare the ideal of one conception with the actuality of another, but rather to compare actuality with actuality, and in our particular historical circumstances» (Rawls, Kelly, 2003: p. 56). Here my inquiry tries to match the Rawlsian.

Building the arguments within the framework of political liberalism is a highly abstract process. However, it is necessary to clarify how that framework emerged and in which historical and political context. Critics always noted that Rawls's ideas were formed mostly by the Enlightenment tradition, and influence of the American political culture, so not of all Western political culture in general (Owen, 2001: p. 114). The historical survival of constitutional democracy was essential for Rawls. He was committed «far too much to questions of political and social stability and thereby to historical contingencies» (Müller, 2006: p. 328).

The American historical background is very different from the Ukrainian one. American or Western European societies were shaped by the agreement about mutual respect and the tolerance of the opposing parties. On the contrary, the main political problem in Ukrainian history was the lack of unity in the face of threats posed by bigger countries, so the «peculiar character of modern Ukrainian political

and social thought was largely determined by the condition of a people living under foreign domination and struggling to establish their own identity as a nation» (Rudnytsky, 1987: p. 91).

Thus, the term «consensus» in this context means not the agreement of equals about the principles of the good life, but the unification of equals because of the dangers that can destroy political society. Still, this kind of unification needs rational justification. While Rawls himself uses the idea of a well-ordered society, in my inquiry, I take into consideration the idea of a not well-ordered society, also proposed by Rawls but never adequately developed. According to Baehr's definition, «such societies lack, or largely lack, public reason. In such societies, it can be important for citizens to reason publicly from their comprehensive doctrines, but to do so «for the sake of the ideal of public reason» (Baehr, 2015: p. 154). Baehr's definition is much more applicable for the Ukrainian context.

I want to show that liberalism is not only the Western view that was shaped by the Enlightenment tradition and nowadays is mostly concerned with the American political agenda. As long as I consider Nussbaum's capability approach as a very tentative version of political liberalism, it is necessary to take a close look at how she presents it.<sup>4</sup> Not to mention that Nussbaum spent a lot of time explaining that the creators of the capabilities approach (both philosophers and economists) were inspired not only by Western thought but by Indian, African, and other traditions as well. So, it is not right to label the capabilities approach or the other versions of post-Rawlsian political liberalism as another example of the western theory.

It is worth noting that it is quite hard to define who the liberals are nowadays and what liberalism exactly is. The task becomes even more complicated when the topic of the inquiry is Ukrainian political history. It is valuable not to forget that every thinking about political liberalism is deeply contextualized. The explanation of the reason why our basic liberal principles «were called “liberal”, cannot be found by searching for any such principle. It must be found instead in complicated accidents of history, in which the self-interest of certain groups, the prevalence of certain political rhetoric, and many other discrete factors played different parts» and «our contemporary notion of “liberal” is formed from that particular package of political aims» (Dworkin, 1979: p. 115).

Despite the rightful critique, political liberalism is trying to provide the answers to the challenges posed by our political reality in its own fashion and with its biases. Still, this theory hardly can be defined as the Western one because its contemporary modifications start from quite cosmopolitan premises.

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<sup>4</sup> «John Rawls, in his most recent writings, explicitly states that his results could not be used either to deal with issues of international justice or to approach questions of justice in societies far removed from liberal democratic traditions deriving from the Enlightenment. My view is that this pessimism is both unjustified and dangerous. Especially in light of the increasing interaction among diverse societies and the frequency of communications, cross-cultural debate about the questions of justice is both possible and actual» (Nussbaum, 1990: p. 207).

## **2. Nussbaum's capability approach: modification of Rawls's political liberalism**

Before I will show how Anderson develops the capability approach, I should mention why I consider the capability approach as a more promising version of political liberalism than «justice as fairness». Because if not so, it would be unclear why to use Anderson's interpretation at all.

Nussbaum addresses the main problems of justice as fairness, but she never argued that it should be abandoned. Only modified. She presents three arguments that address the non-inclusive nature of Rawls's original position (Nussbaum, 2006). When one puts oneself in Rawls's rational procedures that are open to everybody who is ready to use the power of reason to explicate the principles of basic justice which everybody can agree on, one is leaving aside the deliberation process the people with disabilities (**argument 1**) and non-human animals (**argument 2**). Nussbaum is developing Rawls's concept of the «basic goods» and presenting her concept of the «central capabilities» (Nussbaum, 2013: pp. 33-34). From now on, when one is using the veil of ignorance, the capabilities make it possible for us to imagine the needs and conditions of those who are unfortunately excluded from reasoning about the principles of basic justice, because of their nature or because of disability. As far as they are capable of any kind of agency which can coincide with basic capabilities, one needs to make it possible for them to cherish it.

The question of inequality between the nations (**argument 3**) tries to apply basic capabilities as a standard for justifying the principles of basic justice for international relations. While usually one is using criteria such as GDP for measuring the well-being of certain countries, one is losing actual understanding of what people from these countries can do and what can they achieve. Numbers just do not match with real capabilities. Even with very high levels of GDP, many people can be very deprived of the absence of access to basic capabilities. As far as Nussbaum is very concerned with equality, her capability approach became a basis for alternative criteria - HDI (Human Development Index). And as far as the question of equality is important not only for liberals but for Marxists as well, I suppose the latter could find many similarities in the capability approach.

Considering the case of the Ukrainian after war restoration, it could be much more useful to focus on the social groups and their interests that are not represented in the mainstream approach to justice. Another issue is that the economic help from allies can increase the level of Ukraine's GDP, but in fact, many people still could suffer from the inability to meet their basic needs.

## **3. Towards the Marxist interpretation of political conception of justice. Anderson's modification of the capability approach**

Before moving to Anderson's democratic equality, I need to clarify which Marxist positions can find this interpretation of political conception of justice. It seems that in the twenty-first century, Marxism changed the way it addresses social problems



(Callinicos, Kouvelakis, Pradella, 2022). However, because the categorization of contemporary Marxism is still undeveloped, so I will use Kymlicka's one. He proposed to look at contemporary Marxism as two strands where the first one rejects the idea of justice totally and the second one accepts it, but «rejects the liberal belief that justice is compatible with the private ownership of the means of production» (Kymlicka, 2002: p. 168). The second strand also divides itself into critique of exploitation and critique of alienation. I suppose that the Marxist interpretation of political conception is far more possible for the second strand of Marxism which accepts the idea of justice. And as far as the discussion about private property is not the focus of this article, I will consider only the marxist's family of arguments about alienation as ready to meet the arguments of political liberalism.

Still, alienation is connected with a discussion about private property as far as Marxists consider private property «not simply that it is exploitative, for even those who benefit from exploitation are alienated from their essential human powers» (Kellick, 2002: p. 190). I should mention that the capability approach cannot (and does not even attempt to) meet Marxist objections about the abolition of private property. However, it proposes a very promising account that can, in some ways, meet Marxist claims about the alienation. The capability approach «focuses not on the resources (or income, or primary goods) that persons have, nor on the satisfaction (or utility or welfare) that they experience, but rather on their capabilities» (Leopold, 2021: p. 43). Recently it was pointed out that the capabilities approach and Marxism share many similarities. The former was inspired by the latter (Leopold, 2021: p. 43).

It is valuable to take a precise look at Nussbaum's list of basic capabilities to see that the capability - **control over one's environment, (B) Material** - already trying to deal with an alienation problem because for Nussbaum anybody who works should be «able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers» (Nussbaum, 2013: p. 34). Combining it with other capabilities one can go much further there simple distributive justice. It is not enough just to have equal property or material goods. What is crucial is what capabilities are available for the people. Still, from the Marxist point of view, it cannot be enough. Here it is necessary to take into account how Anderson specifies the capabilities approach and how she is trying to improve Nussbaum's theory.

1) Anderson presents a very clear account of the description of metrics of distributive justice considering several criteria. Therefore the «capability theorists all agree, however, that (a) the metric should be objective; (b) the goods subject to demands of justice are functionings; (c) the rule should be distribution-sensitive; and (d) at least part of the rule should be of a constrained procedural type» and the Nussbaum's version of capability approach also tells e) the list of relevant functionings and f) floor on permissible distributive rules (Anderson, 2010: p. 82). Anderson struggles to show how capability theory can meet the objections of Pogge and also why Nussbaum's version of the capability approach is much better than Sen's.

While using Anderson's description of metrics of distributive justice many Marxists can find the capability approach sufficient for themselves.

2) Nevertheless, even though Anderson enriches Nussbaum's account of the capability approach she is also critical of it. She thinks that Nussbaum «has offered too vague an account of where to set the threshold» (Anderson, 2010: p. 83). Thus, Anderson considers her account called «democratic equality» as good enough to meet the failure of Nussbaum's theory. She is presenting three arguments to answer the problems that flow from the capability view (Anderson, 2010: p. 84). **The first argument** is called for the relevant standard of justice in terms of functioning. While adults can choose the capabilities by themselves, children are dependent on their parents and which functionings are accessible for kids also depends on parents. While kids cannot choose capabilities by themselves, it is necessary not to ignore this absence of capabilities. Rather it is important to see what functionings are accessible for them and if this situation fits with the principles of justice. **The second argument** addresses the problem of the least advantaged. As far as it presented the threshold for basic justice, society still grants the people who are living beyond that threshold education and professional opportunities. If they show any level of functioning, they should be able to use it. This argument echoes Nussbaum's argument about the education of people with mental disabilities. However, more clear view of this problem can make this position much more attractive for Marxists. **In the third argument**, Anderson stated the role of democratic equality is not to present the comprehensive theory of distributive justice but rather give a tool for describing the role of equality in the theories of justice. So, when one finds that the present principles of justice are losing something about equality, it is crucial to develop additional principles as far as one wants to call our society just. In the next section, when I will explain my position, I will use the same type of argument when talking about the expansion of political conception of justice.

Considering all Anderson's modifications of Nussbaum's capability approach now it would be much easier to accept the arguments of the capability approach. They could become especially engaging for the bearers of Marxist or semi-Marxist views.

#### 4. Extended political liberalism

In the previous section, I showed how Marxist views could interpret and accept political liberalism. I paid special attention to how Anderson scrutinized the capability approach and showed its prospects. Nevertheless, I suppose this precondition can be improved to make the capability approach even more acceptable for the bearers of different reasonable views. It is necessary to show the problematic places of Nussbaum's position. No matter how promising her view is, there are several things in the capability approach that I find inconsistent. I will add my arguments that call for the new position, **extended political liberalism**, that is «a form of political liberalism within the procedural limits of which it is possible to expand the political conception of justice while preserving political stability and a free background culture along with adhering to the rules of the public reason» (Khoma,



2022: p. 76). Extended political liberalism is based on the Nussbaum's capability approach. It considers Nussbaum's dedication to presenting a more inclusive account of political conception of justice. However, extended political liberalism is more concerned with presenting the method of justification of the potential broader political conception of justice with clear procedures.

When Nussbaum presents the arguments against the non-inclusive account of Rawls's justice as fairness, she fails to answer the procedural vagueness borrowed from Rawls. Even if Rawls's position excludes a lot of people from the deliberation about basic justice, he at least presents a coherent system of procedures for such deliberation: original position, the veil of ignorance, reflective equilibrium, and public reason.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, Nussbaum is trying to build the capability approach on Rawls's system of procedures and at the same time criticizing them. However, she did not propose a clear answer on how exactly one can change these procedures. I suppose that it is hard for her to answer a couple of crucial questions: 1) How the political conception of justice is developing into the list of basic capabilities? 2) How the «right» and the «good» are related within her approach? 3) How comprehensive doctrines interact beyond the domain of public political culture? 4) Which criterion should be used during that procedures and so during the process of public deliberation? (Khoma, 2022: p. 70).

Nussbaum's arguments against Rawls should reflect its essence on the procedures presented by Rawls. If not, it is quite hard to understand how a more inclusive version of political liberalism can use the same procedures. And if so, the arguments against Rawls are endangered because Nussbaum does not demonstrate how they will work on the level of procedures. For example, if people with disabilities cannot represent themselves in public deliberation, it is not enough to say that they should be represented by their guardians (Nussbaum, 2006: p. 137). It is necessary then to find other ways to make the reflection about the experience of people with disabilities part of the reflection of persons who are reasoning about principles of justice, explicating these principles, and then constructing the procedure of justification. The same goes for justice for non-human animals (Nussbaum, 2006: pp. 325-407). As far as one can understand them only on the level of capability performance, the criteria for adopting future policies becomes fully capability-utilitarian. To avoid this risk, it is important to implement the reflection about it on the level of procedures as well.

### **Paideia argument**

Departing from the analysis explicated above, I will demonstrate how extended political liberalism can contribute to the capability approach. Nussbaum argues that the ten basic capabilities are enough to meet the threshold for basic justice. But if society is ready to expand on its previous vision of basic justice, how can it be done using the old account?

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<sup>5</sup> The question concerning the procedures of deliberation was always very important for Rawls. See, for example (Rawls, 1951).

Nussbaum always noted that her basic capabilities were not designed to form any kind of hierarchy between them. Still, for the possible expansion of the previous political conception of justice, it is important to focus more on the two of them: **practical reason** and **affiliation**. Together they form the process of *paideia* that «helps the citizens to form their own conception of the good, without forcing them to accept the only one comprehensive doctrine, but with respect for any reasonable comprehensive doctrine and accordingly to the foundations of public reason and political conception» (Khoma, 2022: p. 71). Thus, in a just society, basic capabilities must be not only accessible for the people but also be exposed to criticism or modified if needed throughout the public education. It also needs to be mentioned that the public education should give the people an understanding that the bearers of the comprehensive doctrines should be considered as free and equal and also a subjects of interest. Sometimes people with different worldviews describe the same phenomena or the solution to the problem using different words, dictionaries, aspirations from traditions. But they talk about the same thing. And if that thing was never presented in the political conception of justice, maybe it is time to expand it with something new.

One really can have equal access to the realization of basic capabilities when one can understand the best way to realize them. That is hardly possible without reflection about person's own conception of the good and interpretation of political conception of justice throughout other worldviews, which one can someday partially accept and use in our own life. So, the interpretation of political conception of justice gives the people access to more perspective accounts of deliberation.

Nevertheless, *paideia* is not only about the system of education, but about the citizens' development in certain societies. «If citizens of a well ordered society are to recognize one another as free and equal, basic institutions must educate them to this conception of themselves, as well as publicly exhibit and encourage this ideal of political justice» (Rawls, Kelly, 2003: p. 56). As far as one is talking about the *paideia* partly as education, it should be mentioned that this kind of education never goes beyond the political conception of justice. But people should feel free to bring on their convictions from the background culture as far as they are reasonable. That strategy is more likely for not well ordered societies that have problems with clear rules of public reason and the long tradition of the democratic political culture. However, my assumption here is that it will be much easier for the people to create common rules of justification from reasoning about political conception of justice throughout their comprehensive doctrines and understand how other views can contribute to and cherish your view about the political conception of justice.

Along with the *paideia* argument I introduce the idea of the interpretation of political conception of justice. I consider it a procedure that individuals should apply to themselves when discussing matters of basic justice. If all of this sounds too abstract one cannot argue that the complexity of the social processes and influences of literature, art, and films are always parts of our thinking about political conception of justice.

Previously I showed that Baehr presented a solid feminist interpretation of political liberalism (Baehr, 2015). Another example is Anderson's Marxist interpretation when she modifies Nussbaum's capability approach. Deneulin and Zampini-Davies provided us with a great account of how one can interpret the capability approach throughout the Christianity (Chiappero, Martinetti, Osmani, Qizilbash, 2021).

### **Interdependency of right and good**

Previously I presented the **paideia argument**. Now it is valuable to add more clarity for the implementation of this argument in the procedures of choosing the basic principles of justice. I am considering the case of not well-ordered societies because of their instability, which comes to the position of reevaluating their basic principles of justice. Not every process of reevaluation should result in revolution, but it happens from time to time. I emphasize the framework developed by extended political liberalism is aimed to meet the totality of political life. When people can explicate their vision of political conception of justice and are more successful in justifying it at least on the level of personal reflection (which comes with paideia), they can expand what they considered as political conception of justice before. It goes not only with revolutions but with elections, lawmaking, public disobedience and peaceful demonstrations.

Nevertheless, despite the differences between well-ordered and not well-ordered societies, it is crucial to say that the expansion of political conception of justice is possible for the former one as well or at least it is not impossible. Even if they are stable and have a long tradition of certain political culture, they should seek more justice, as far as the ideal of person and society as a fair system of cooperation accepted by the major part of that societies requires them to work on the existing inequalities. It is never about preserving the status quo.

So which framework for the implementation of the paideia argument is better to choose? I think that it would be reasonable to mention the distinction between the right and the good. «The structure of an ethical doctrine depends upon how it relates these two notions and defines their differences» (Rawls, 1999: p. 392). While Rawls defies this relation as the priority of the right over the good, he also leaves room for interpretation. Here I will borrow Richardson's idea of constructive ethical pragmatism. Its main idea is a new type of relation - interdependency of right and good without domination of any of them. A certain understanding of good creates new standards for right, which also develops a new understanding of good.<sup>6</sup>

If the people have access to the paideia, then they can redefine their comprehensive doctrines. It can result in a new interpretation of the political conception of justice. However, this is not necessary (Khoma, 2022: p. 78). Still, throughout life citizens can experience something new and become ready to expand their political conception of justice.

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<sup>6</sup> For this argument see (Richardson, 1995) and (Richardson, 2018).

## Conclusion

In this article, I tried to present arguments that can be met by any person who is in some way sympathetic to Marxism. My goal was not to show that political liberalism is better than Marxism or that political liberalism is right therefore Marxism is the family of wrong theories. I wanted to show that political liberalism once presented by Rawls gives us a very good framework to understand that people with different worldviews can find something to agree on. I showed how Nussbaum modifies Rawls's account of political liberalism. Then I showed how Anderson expands on Nussbaum's capability approach. Taking into account the general line of Anderson's democratic equality and her critique of Nussbaum, I presented my view, entitled **extended political liberalism**. Along with the paideia argument and the argument about the interdependency of right and good, I showed why the notion of interpretation of political conception of justice is crucial for any form of political liberalism.

However, all that theoretical work was done to address the real problems that can emerge in Ukrainian society very soon. Of course, I am aware of the fact that any theory is marked with utopianism. But as Rawls claimed, one needs to strive to develop a realistic utopia. So as I mentioned before I never intended to give the guideline, but to present some arguments that any reasonable person who is ready to use the power of her mind can accept, object, or improve.

Anderson's critique of the capability approach gives us not only an understanding of how liberals and Marxists can get on well with each other but also presents us with very interesting insights about the future of Ukraine. People who are in charge of the government projects and public policies for the restoration of Ukraine build their arguments on certain criteria of justice. Ordinary citizens who can object to unjust policies do it as well. It is a crucial question that is in my opinion still not answered. But what would be the right thing to do is to agree (and if so to implement it into the practice) that it is crucial to focus on objective metrics. As far as almost every person in Ukraine was affected by war (not considering the vast amount of people affected by it indirectly), it will be a bad strategy to build everything on subjective preferences. How can one do so working for example with people who were living under the Russian occupation or the veterans? For instance, if some people just could not address their problems, others might develop inadequate metrics, the main task of which will be to answer the question: "Who meets the formal victim criteria in order to receive redistributed funds?", thought to divide society. This way of thinking and questioning is inconsistent with the consensus based on the Anderson's criterion of delivering goods and capabilities that helps people achieve the threshold level of basic justice. To address the question: "Who meets the formal victim criteria in order to receive redistributed funds?" the more plausible step will be to focus on the idea of the least advantaged.

Even though societies are very dynamic, people should always have the tools to think about politics and their own life goals. Most of it comes with a good system of basic education that should be accessible to anyone. If people will not be able to do so, the future of their societies could be very fragile and unpredictable.

This condition makes populism dangerously feasible. To not let that happen, it is necessary to revitalize the idea of the overlapping consensus. Trying to understand the nearest future, I think that this step should be considered not only by Ukrainian society but by any democratic society as well.

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