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THE DEBATES ON WAR AND DEMOCRACY

Since the 1970s, scholars have begun to pay special attention to the questions of whether democracy guarantees peace, whether freedom should be sacrificed in the name of security during war, how sustainable peace is possible, and what threats war poses to democracy. In the same period, influenced by the legacy of Immanuel Kant and David Hume, the democratic peace hypothesis began to be developed. This article discusses the theoretical debate concerning this hypothesis, as well as the question of whether the type of political regime affects the state's success in war. An examining of the theoretical debates has shown that the proponents of the democratic peace hypothesis have not been able to provide convincing evidence of a direct link between the type of political regime and the willingness to initiate war or maintain peace. At the same time, the debate disproves another common belief, that of the military weakness of democracies.

The article notes that the prevalent theoretical approach to studying the issue of war and democracy is based on an eschatological idea of the future democratic world. In contrast to this view, Gunther Anders' idea of an «apocalypse without a Kingdom» opens up a new perspective for understanding war and democracy, which is that the destruction that war brings is not followed by the construction of a new world. In this case, the main task is not to achieve democracy as a result of war, but to preserve democracy during war.

Keywords: *democracy, authoritarianism, war, Kant, democratic peace.*

When Woodrow Wilson declared war on Germany in his speech to Congress on April 2, 1917, he outlined the main objective of the United States in this war: «The world must be made safe for democracy». This famous phrase became the first articulation of protecting democracy as a goal of war. However, Wilson's view that war is less likely in a world of democracies was not new to political thought. The idea of a close correlation between types of political regime and international conflict first emerged in the Age of Enlightenment. We find it in David Hume's reflections on the balance of power, when he argues that democratic public opinion shows hostility, or, as he wrote, «imprudent vehemence», toward dictatorships, thereby provoking wars (Hume, 1987: pp. 338—339; see also: Doyle, 1983b: p. 323). However, the most systematic exposition of the relationship between peace and democracy can be found in Immanuel Kant. Unlike Hume, he approached the problem from the point of view of relations between democracies. In his essay «To Perpetual Peace», Kant points out that democracies do not fight each other because citizens of democratic states do not consider each other enemies. Therefore, the spread of democracy leads to the establishment of permanent peace in international relations or, according to the logic of Wilson's speech, «if the world could be made safe for democracy, democracy would make the world safe» (Hobson, 2015: p. 146). The achievement of the American president in this case consists of his attempt to embody the Kantian theory in the political program, and this attempt found its continuation in the democratic peace hypothesis (sometimes also referred to as the democratic peace theory).

No less important is another statement on war and democracy. It was made after Wilson's speech and in opposition to it. In 1918, one of the leading American sociologists of the first half of the twentieth century, Charles Ellwood, wrote, that war cannot make the world safe for democracy, because «war through all the ages has been one of the greatest enemies of democracy. Not only has militancy tended towards the rule of force and towards despotism in general, but even a defensive warfare, such as that in which we are now engaged, has more than once resulted in the subversion of democracy both in government and in society at large» (Ellwood, 1918: p. 511). Democracy cannot be the result of war, no matter how just war may be, because by its very nature, democracy contradicts the rule of raw power that characterizes war.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the problem of democracy and war did not become the subject of theoretical reflection. We see the revival of interest in this problem only in the second half of the last century. This is no coincidence, since in the first half of the last century, democracy itself was challenged by mass movements, their ideologies, and their leaders, especially in European countries (the so-called «authoritarian wave»), while the collapse of the socialist camp was accompanied by the emergence of numerous new democratic states (the «third wave of democratization»). In the 1990s, it seemed to many that the complex issues of war and democracy had been resolved. However, further developments have shown that this is not the case. Questions such as whether democracy guarantees peace and whether war threatens democracy or whether there is a place for democracy or even talking about democracy during war remain without defined answers. The beliefs that national security often requires the sacrifice of political freedoms and that democracy is militarily ineffective have been common since antiquity and were embodied

in the twentieth century in the works of Hans Morgenthau and Samuel Huntington. But are these views justified? Does the frequent desire to restrict or even eliminate political freedoms in wartime conditions pose a serious threat to the society in whose defense these extraordinary measures are to be aimed? Is the idea of a democratic peace no more than a dangerous utopia? Over the past three decades, these questions have been the subject of theoretical discussions, which will now be the focus of this study.

The Democratic Peace Hypothesis

The democratic peace hypothesis actually determined the development of the post-Soviet space and the post-Cold war world as a whole for several decades. The history of the development of this hypothesis begins with *The Act on the Establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*, adopted by the US Congress in 1961. One of the tasks assigned to this agency was the study of various political, economic, legal, social, and other factors for «the prevention of war with a view to a better understanding of how the basic structure of a lasting peace may be established» (House of Representatives, 1961). Resolving this problem, Dean Babst published an article in which he hypothesized that freely elected governments of independent countries act as a guarantee of stable peace because «the general public does not want war, if it can choose» (Babst, 1964: p. 9). Actually, this was the first formulation of the democratic peace hypothesis (that is, democracies avoid entering into armed conflict with each other), which Babst justified with statistical data from the history of wars. Based on an analysis of these data, he concludes that in the question of war and peace, it is not the national characteristics of a particular people that are important but the established «form of government» (Babst, 1964: p. 14), specifically whether that form is democratic or not.

Thirty years after Babst's article was published, his idea was perceived as banal. Thus, in 1994, Jack Levy began his review of «Grasping the Democratic Peace» by Bruce Russett with a statement about the triviality of the thesis that «democracies almost never go to war with each other» (Levy, 1994: p. 352)[1], and the editorial introduction to the issue of *International Security* described this statement as «the conventional wisdom» (Editors' Note, 1994: p. 3). In other words, in the 1990s, many considered the democratic peace hypothesis the rule of international relations. This was facilitated by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the fact that, after the end of the Cold War, US state authorities began to base their international policy on the idea of a democratic peace. For instance, in the State of the Union message, US President Bill Clinton, echoing Wilson and partly Ronald Reagan with his famous «crusade for freedom,» directly postulated this idea: «Democracies don't attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy» (State of the Union, 1994). Moreover, and more importantly, Babst had a whole school of followers who developed his system of argumentation in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, today we associate the democratic peace hypothesis less with his name than with the names of theorists such as Rudolf Rummel and Michael Doyle.

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[1] According to Levy, this «proposition has acquired a nearly law-like status, confidently invoked by policy makers as well as by scholars» (Levy, 1994: p. 352).

Not Babst's article but the fourth volume of Rummel's magnum opus, «Understanding Conflict and War, subtitled War, Power and Peace» (1979), actually gave rise to the democratic peace hypothesis. Rommel does not simply follow the Wilsonians in arguing that liberal democracies are less warlike than authoritarian or, especially, totalitarian regimes. He states that democracies are at war. In his view, however, their main characteristic is that they are at war with non-democracies, whereas liberal democracies do not wage wars among themselves. In an article written after the publication of «Understanding Conflict and War», Rummel explores this issue in more detail, pointing out first that freedom prevents violence[2] and second that liberal regimes mutually exclude violence[3], violence being possible only when one of the states is not a liberal democracy. Like Babst, Rummel justifies these theses on the analysis of empirical data on interstate conflicts and wars between 1816 and 1974.

Similarly, Michael Doyle, in his acclaimed article «Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs» (1983), recognizes that democracies themselves are not peace-loving. However, following Kant, Doyle argues that their institutional structure (Doyle, 1983a: p. 235) results in democracies not going to war with each other, while their relations with nonliberal societies often represent a policy of «liberal imperialism»[4]. Like Rummel, Doyle takes great care to justify his hypothesis on the empirical data, but, in general, he develops his position based on Kant's doctrine, namely his three articles of the Treaty of Perpetual Peace.

At the end of the Cold War, it was widely believed that there was a broad consensus on the democratic peace hypothesis. In reality, this consensus was largely confined to political circles. As for scholars, although many of them — liberal political theorists — actually perceived it not as a hypothesis or a theory but as an axiom, at the same time realists made significant criticisms. Therefore, it is more correct to say there was an academic discussion that still goes on today[5]. The format of the article does not allow for a detailed review of all the critics' objections and supporters' counterarguments regarding the democratic peace hypothesis[6]. I will point out only the most important criticisms, as a result of which the theoretical influence of the democratic peace hypothesis has significantly decreased.

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[2] «The freer the people of a state, the more nonviolent its elite's expectations and perceptions, and the less likely they are to commit official violence against other states» (Rummel, 1983: p. 28).

[3] «Their mutual domestic diversity and pluralism, their free and competitive press, their people-to-people and elite-to-elite bonds and relationships, and their mutual identification and sympathy will foreclose on any expectation or occurrence of war between them» (Rummel, 1983: p. 28; see also: Rummel, 1979: pp. 447, 277—279).

[4] Doyle sees the problem in such liberal imperialism and the resulting interventionism. In order to overcome it, he argues, that it is important to extend liberal principles to relations with nonliberal states. According to him, the «policy toward the liberal and the nonliberal world should be guided by general liberal principles» (Doyle, 1983a: p. 344).

[5] About this discussion see: (Chan, 1984; Brown, Jones, & Miller, 1996; Hegre, 2014; Weisiger, & Gartzke, 2016).

[6] The positions of the supporters are presented in (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Benoit, 1996; Gries, Fox, Jing, Mader, Scotto, & Reifler, 2020).

The primary criticism of the democratic peace hypothesis is directed at its two key points. First, the criticism points to the inconsistency of the empirical justification of the peacefulness of democracies in their relations with each other. Second, it demonstrates the theoretical weakness of the democratic peace hypothesis.

Steve Chan was one of the first to point out the influence of the interpretation of variables such as «war», «freedom», and «democracy» on the results of the analysis of empirical data. He points out that Babst only examines wars between «*independent* nations», and Rummel only examines «interstate wars». They leave out numerous colonial and imperialist wars fought mainly by European states with political freedoms. Moreover, they ignore the fact that the further we go into the past, the more difficult it is to determine the degree of freedom of a particular state and, accordingly, to compare political regimes (Chan, 1984: pp. 619, 622, 631). As Chan rightly points out, Babst, Rummel, and their followers ignore the historical context. «For instance, although it is doubtful that Britain in 1816 can be considered politically free according to today's standards, it was certainly more politically free than Russia and the Ottoman Empire at that time», and according to Rummel's approach, Britain should have fought fewer wars than these countries, although in fact, it was no more peaceful (Chan, 1984: p. 631)[7]. In other words, taking into account the historical context gives us a very different idea of conflicts and wars than the one on which Rummel draws his conclusions.

Erich Weede, for his part, concedes that democratic regimes are theoretically more concerned with preventing war than non-democratic ones. At the same time, he stresses that it does not follow that peace is actually achieved when democracy spreads. For example, citizens who oppose fighting may also oppose concessions that are necessary for the sake of peace (Weede, 1984: pp. 652—653). Based on war data for the period 1960—1980, Weede concludes that the periods of negative correlation between democracy and war have been extremely brief and that, in general, there is no reason to claim «a robust and reasonably strong relationship between permanent democracy and war involvement» (Weede, 1984: p. 659).

Moreover, as Charles Kegley and Margaret Hermann show, it was not until the beginning of the «third wave of democratization», when there were many democratic states in the world, that it became possible to empirically test the democratic peace hypothesis. (After all, as the researchers note (for example: Morgan, 1993), even before the middle of the twentieth century, there were few democratic states, they were not always bordering each other, and the statistical probability of war between them was low). Analyzing data from 1974 to 1988, Kegley and Hermann demonstrate that the behavior of democracies in the international arena is not so different from that of non-democratic regimes. However, the peculiarity of the former is that they tend to conduct conflicts of lower intensity than wars, preferring other ways of interfering in the internal politi-

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[7] «If we compare Britain during the nineteenth century with Britain during the twentieth century, it has obviously become freer as well as more pacific (measured in terms of the frequency, but not the intensity, of wars). On the other hand, if we compare nineteenth century Britain with other countries during the same period (an approach used in this analysis), it was clearly more war prone even though it was also freer» (Chan, 1984: p. 643).

cal situations of other states, including democratic ones[8]. The authors conclude that a world safe for democracy does not mean a generally safe world (see: Kegley & Hermann, 1995: p. 11)[9]. In other words, as Kegley and Hermann's study shows, democratic regimes are not more peaceful than other regimes; perhaps the most we can talk about is the transformation of conflict types under the influence of varying political regimes.

The results of Kegley and Hermann's study are not original. The idea that democracies do indeed attack other democracies, though not always in the form of actual military intervention but rather in the form of nonmilitary pressure and coercion, emerged in the early 1990s. For instance, scholars such as Michael Hunt and David Forsythe, analyzing US international policy, identified the following reasons for the aggressive foreign policy of democracies: an expanded definition of national security interests, a conservative national ideology, and «a general neo-Kantian outlook» (James & Glenn, 1995: p. 90)[10]. The final reason attracts special attention. It refutes the basic thesis of the democratic peace hypothesis, presented in particular in the aforementioned work of Doyle, that peace among democracies is institutionally conditioned and that, accordingly, the spread of democratic institutions leads to the spread of a «zone of peace» (Doyle). In fact, as Christopher Layne convincingly demonstrates in an analysis of four crises in relations between democratic states — two crises between the United States and Great Britain (1861 and 1895—1896), one between France and Great Britain (1898), and one between France and Germany (1923) — that countries avoided war not because they had democratic institutions at the time but because they followed the principles of realism. Thus, Layne writes of the American—British crisis of 1861 that its peaceful resolution «is explained by realism, not democratic peace theory» (Layne, 1994: p. 21)[11]. Thus, «democratic peace» is not free of domination

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[8] The researchers note: «As freedom spread between 1974 and 1988, the proportion of interventions initiated by democratically oriented regimes (especially by free polities) increased while concomitantly those by nondemocracies decreased. In the 1974—1978 period when free regimes comprised 28 percent of the system's membership, they initiated 25 percent of the interventions, but by the 1984—1988 period when free regimes comprised 34 percent of the system's membership they initiated 44 percent of the interventions» (Kegley & Hermann, 1995: p. 6).

[9] Kegley and Hermann found at least 15 cases between 1974 and 1988 in which democratic states engaged in military intervention against other democratic states. Gregory D. Hess and Athanasios Orphanides, who used the equilibrium model to study the behavior of countries in the international arena, come to a similar conclusion: a democratic world does not mean a world without wars (see: Hess & Orphanides, 2001).

[10] In turn, Kegley and Hermann argue that the victims of democracies are mainly «relatively weak democracies that seek changes in structural dependency and are vulnerable to outside efforts at destabilization» (Kegley & Hermann, 1995: p. 92).

[11] Layne explains: «Contrary to democratic peace theory's expectations, the mutual respect between democracies rooted in democratic norms and culture had no influence on British policy. Believing that vital reputational interests affecting its global strategic posture were at stake, London played diplomatic hardball, employed military threats, and was prepared to go to war if necessary. Both the public and the elites in Britain preferred war to conciliation. Across the Atlantic, public and governmental opinion in the North was equal-

and violent intervention to pursue, among other things, economic interests, which, according to the neo-Kantians, are the very key to peace[12].

The theoretical discussion the democratic peace hypothesis provoked makes it possible to see that this hypothesis can be justified only if one accepts certain limitations. In particular, scholars should mainly use empirical data from before the «third wave of democratization», ignore a certain type of conflict (in particular, veiled violent interference in the internal politics of other states is not considered a form of war), and not take into account historical context. The democratic peace hypothesis is not as influential and self-evident today as it was at the end of the Cold War. However, its proponents are trying to give it a new empirical justification in light of the criticisms that have been raised[13]. In fact, after a period of oblivion, scholars once again drew attention to Joseph Schumpeter's statement that «while liberal democracies generally shy away from warfare, they often become aggressive when it pays» (James & Glenn, 1995: p. 91). Not surprisingly, the focus of political theorists today has shifted from whether democracies wage war against democracies to how effective democracies are at war.

Democracies at War

As the researchers point out, the idea that democracies are unable to wage war prevailed from Sparta's victory over Athens in the Peloponnesian War until the founding of the United States (Dobransky, 2013: p. 2). However, as the number of democratic

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ly bellicose. An Anglo-American conflict was avoided only because the Lincoln administration came to understand that diplomatic humiliation was preferable to a war that would have arrayed Britain with the Confederacy and thus probably have secured the South's independence» (Layne, 1994: pp. 21—22).

[12] Under the influence of the criticism of the democratic peace hypothesis, the theory of «capitalist peace» appeared. According to this theory, the key role in the cause of peace between democracies is assigned not to political but to liberal economic institutions. Within the framework of capitalist peace theory, the correlation between peace and democratic politics is refuted; peace, according to the proponents of this theory, is a consequence of the development of trade among democracies and, as a result, their increased interdependence.

[13] See, for example, an interesting but controversial attempt to substantiate the key postulates of the democratic peace hypothesis — namely, that democracies are not hostile to each other (Kant) and that citizens of democracies are hostile to non-democracies (Hume) — based on the country feeling thermometer in (Gries, Fox, Jing, Mader, Scotto, & Reifler, 2020). However, even the data provided in this article suggest that, in some cases, the feelings of US citizens and citizens of Western European democracies toward the same countries (e.g., Israel) may differ. This suggests that, contrary to the position of the proponents of democratic peace, the basic factor determining the attitude of citizens of democratic countries toward a particular state is not the nature of the political regime but rather whether that country is perceived as a source of ontological insecurity. Indirect evidence for the correctness of this assumption is also found in the fact that citizens of democracies can support the idea of cooperation with non-democracies. For example, according to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the majority of US citizens are willing to cooperate with authoritarian countries if doing so serves US national interests (see: Smeltz & Sullivan, 2022).

regimes in the world increased and as democracies became more involved in wars, two common beliefs were shaken: first, that democracies are exceptionally peaceful and second, that democracy is militarily ineffective, which implies that in the event of war, security is preferable to political freedom. As it turned out, democracies are capable of war-making and war-winning. Moreover, the position that democracies are actually militarily stronger than authoritarian regimes has become widespread in the literature (Lake, 1992; Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Reiter & Stam, 1998; Reiter & Stam, 2002). There is simply no agreement among scholars on how democracies become winners — that is, what exactly gives them a military advantage over autocracies.

David Lake's article «Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War» (1992) was one of the first attempts to explain the military victories of democracies. Lake provides an economic explanation for the military successes of democracy. He views states from the perspective of macroeconomic theory as rent-seekers — that is, by analogy with firms seeking to maximize profits. He argues that democracies are more effective than autocracies because they seek to create fewer economic imbalances and interfere less with the free market, possess more national wealth, and devote more resources to national security. In addition, democracies are able to form alliances with other democracies, and the authorities of democratic countries must receive public approval for their policies (Lake, 1992: p. 24, 32). These are all prerequisites for success in war. In confirmation of his position, Lake cites data on wars between 1816 and 1988 involving democracies (he uses data from the Polity index to determine the level of democracy), from which he concludes that for every four victories of democracy, there was only one defeat.

Other explanations for the success of democratic regimes in war have included the hypotheses that the military strength of democracies lies in their ability to create stable international alliances (Raknerud & Hegre, 1997); that democracies often win wars because of the prudence of their political leaders, who initiate only those wars that can be won and make greater efforts to mobilize resources to achieve victory than do authoritarian leaders (Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow 2003; Croco, 2011); or, finally, that democratic states, «more often than not, … enjoy stronger human capital, better civil—military relations, or cultural traits that conduce to superior war fighting» (Biddle & Long, 2004: p. 541). However, none of these numerous hypotheses has become dominant. Moreover, a number of significant comments have been made about them.

One such critical position is that of Michael S. Desch. He finds the arguments of Lake and other «democratic triumphalists», as Desch calls those convinced of the military superiority of democracy over autocracy, unfounded. With respect to Lake, Desch notes that Lake provides no evidence for his basic claim that democracies, at the expense of an economy relatively free from government interference, are better wealth creators than other types of regimes, nor any evidence that democracies are the most successful at converting economic power into military power (Desch, 2002: p. 26—27). Or, in contrast to those who, like Bruce Russett, claim that broad democratic participation also contributes to effective military policy, he shows that «a political system that gives voice to large numbers of individuals with diverse preferences may not be able to

reconcile those differences and produce coherent policies» (Desch, 2002: p. 34). More-over, as Desch points out, the leaders of democratic states often enjoy no more popular support than authoritarian leaders (Desch, 2002: p. 37). According to him, success in war is influenced not by the type of political regime but by other factors (the initial mili-tary and economic power of the state, the nature of the conflict, the sense of danger that unites the citizens, etc.), which form different constellations in different cases.

Influenced by the criticism, Lake eventually took a less categorical position, clari-fying that his theory «does not predict that democracy will matter a lot in determin-ing war outcomes... It only suggests that democracy will contribute positively to vic-tory, which it clearly does» (Lake, 2003: p. 166). In turn, Dan Rather and Allan Stam, whom Desh also criticized, have acknowledged that some of the empirical data they based their conclusions on (for instance, a dataset of individual battles produced by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization) «is imperfect and that much work remains» (Reiter & Stam, 2003: p. 179). In other words, they recognized that their models were working hypotheses and needed further refinement.

A study by Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch criticized the claim that the military strength of democracies stems from their ability to form stable interna-tional coalitions even with autocracies[14]. In fact, as Gartzke and Gleditsch show in reference to the behavior of France and Germany on the eve of World War II, democ-racies are not reliable allies during war (Gartzke & Gleditsch, 2004). Finally, the fairly common notion that democracies often win wars because they are more cautious and only fight wars they can win is indeed confirmed by the policies of many influential democratic states in the second half of the twentieth century. However, it can only explain a limited number of cases and is therefore not exhaustive.

In the last decade, the search for an answer to the question of the effectiveness of democracy during war has led researchers to revise the theoretical models developed in the early 2000s and, in particular, to apply new research methods, such as experiments.

For instance, Steve Dobransky proposed modernizing Lake's model. First, he took into account those wars that Lake did not, namely those in the period from 1988 to 2008 (that is, the wars that occurred after the end of the Cold War, when the number of democracies in the world increased rapidly), and second, he added a number of new variables for the analysis of wars «to see if there is more to military victory than the de-gree of democracy» (Dobransky, 2014: p. 4). Interestingly, Dobransky's conclusions not only confirm Lake's model in general but also add some important details. Specifically, Dobransky finds out that «democracies can win wars, even long wars, without sacrific-ing any significant degree of their political structures and without any political break-downs in their governments» (Dobransky, 2014: p. 11). However, he acknowledges that more research will be necessary for the refinement and development of his findings.

Unlike most works in which the authors base their theoretical constructions on data from the history of war, Andrew W. Bausch used a laboratory experiment to clarify the relationship between the type of political regime and the strategy of politi-

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[14] Such a position defends, for example: (Raknerud & Hegre, 1997).

cal leaders during war (Bausch, 2017). Based on the selectorate theory developed by Bueno de Mesquita, according to which all political leaders, regardless of the type of political regime, strive to remain in power, Bausch designed and conducted the following experiment at New York University's Center for Experimental Social Science: Two groups with democratic and authoritarian rules were formed, whose leaders decided in three rounds whether to start a war and, if so, how much effort should be put into it. Depending on the results of these rounds, the leaders were reelected in accordance with each group's internal rules. The experiment showed that democratic leaders choose to go to war more often than authoritarian leaders, and when they lose, they are more likely to be removed from office than losing authoritarian leaders[15]. As a result, Bausch concluded, democratic leaders are forced to mobilize more resources during war and make greater efforts to win than authoritarian leaders to maintain power. This makes democracies more likely to win.

Although the arguments that Bausch and many other «triumphalists» use to justify their position seem convincing in many ways, their models generally suffer from two significant drawbacks. First, they usually fail to take into account the fact that democratic regimes differ significantly from each other and that these differences may be significant enough to influence their behavior in the international arena and in military conflict. The same is true for authoritarian regimes. The consideration of the fact of differences in the study of wars is a rather difficult task, but it is a necessary one. Second, they usually do not take into account that war itself can lead to an internal transformation of a democratic regime, contributing to the growth of authoritarian tendencies associated with the restriction of freedoms, the exclusion and persecution of dissent, and the consolidation of society, for example, not on civil but on ethnocultural grounds.

Strong evidence that differences between regimes of the same type should be taken into account by scholars can be found in «Dictators at War and Peace» (2014) by Jessica L. P. Weeks. Weeks analyzes authoritarian regimes and shows that there are the same differences between them as there are between democracies and that these differences are manifested in their international policy. She distinguishes between authoritarian regimes in which leaders must reckon with a strong ruling elite (for example, China or the Soviet Union after Stalin)[16] and those in which leaders are not limited in their actions by elite or party groups (North Korea or Iraq under Saddam Hussein). In the first case, leaders tend to be more careful in making decisions about war and peace because they are responsible to the elites. In the second case, they are more prone to initiating international conflicts. Furthermore, in the second case, authoritarian regimes have more chances to be defeated than in the first (Weeks, 2014: pp. 54—82). Weeks's groundbreaking study, which has attracted a great degree of attention from

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[15] As Bausch puts it, «autocrats increased their probability of reselection by winning a war, but losing a war did not hurt them relative to avoiding a war», while «democratic leaders found culpable for wars are punished by their domestic audience if they lose the war» (Bausch, 2017: p. 832).

[16] It also matters whether the elite is predominantly civilian or military, as in the case of the junta.

international relations theorists, demonstrates the importance of a nuanced approach to political regimes and has contributed to the arguments of those who believe that the institutional features of democracy support its success during war.

The situation of Japanese Americans in the United States during World War II is a vivid example of the negative impact that war can have on democratic societies. In this case, the effects included violations of civil rights, forced settlement in concentration camps, and numerous unjustified arrests of Japanese Americans, when the authorities claimed to be acting in the interest of national security but in fact simply succumbed to anti-Japanese hysteria in American society (see, for example: Nagata, Kim, & Nguyen, 2015). In 1988, the US government acknowledged that its internment policy was illegal, apologized for it, and compensated the victims. Nevertheless, discussion of this case continues in the United States today[17], and the anti-Islamic sentiments after the September 11 terrorist attack have become an incentive for this discussion. This example shows that even in a democratic society, under conditions of acute crisis, such as war, feelings of fear, suspicion of «others,» and ethnic solidarity can undermine civic solidarity and democratic practices. Moreover, the false choice in favor of security at the expense of freedom, uniformity at the expense of difference, and agreement at the expense of disagreement — in other words, the choice in favor of violating democratic principles — often turns out to be one of the first consequences of the outbreak of war.

Conclusion: War as a Threat to Democracy

The analysis of the debate on war and democracy allows us to see the unjustifiability of the democratic peace hypothesis. Woodrow Wilson's view of the possibility of a world safe for democracy, based on the Kantian doctrine of perpetual peace, seems untenable against the background of the willingness of democracies to initiate wars (or other forms of violent intervention) not only against non-democratic regimes but against democratic states as well. The belief that the spread of democracy around the world will lead to peaceful coexistence among nations has proven to be a dangerous illusion. The «crusade» in the name of democracy is as sacred as the medieval crusades. Proponents of the democratic peace hypothesis have not been able to provide convincing evidence of a direct correlation between the type of political regime and the willingness to initiate war. It is no coincidence that the modern debate on war and democracy has focused mainly on the problem of how political institutions affect the success of states in war.

However, old ideas about the weakness of democracies have been disproven. The claim that democracies win the wars they wage is not indisputable. Like the question of how democracies win wars, it is still a subject of study. Nevertheless, existing studies have at least shown that war cannot be used as an excuse to restrict civil rights and freedoms. Moreover, it is highly probable that such a restriction would lead to a decrease in the effectiveness of a democratic state's actions during war and, accordingly, to an increase in the probability of defeat — that is, to a weakening rather than

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[17] See the book of a conservative political thinker caused a resonance and numerous controversies: (Malkin, 2004).

a strengthening of its national security. The political culture of a democratic society, which promotes greater citizen participation in decision-making, cohesion between the army and the population, and greater accountability of leaders, is a prerequisite for military victory. This means that it is not only appropriate but also extremely necessary to talk about democracy and its problems during a war.

Finally, the theoretical problems faced by scholars of democracy and war suggest the need for a revision of existing theoretical approaches. These approaches ignore the negative impact that war can have on democracy, undermining the political institutions of even developed democratic societies, to which Ellwood draws attention. But this inattention is understandable. As Albert Camus once wrote: «A life is paid for by another life, and from these two sacrifices springs the promise of a value» (Camus, 1956: p. 169). The idea of democratic peace is based on the eschatological belief that the true meaning of war lies outside itself. This vision makes it possible to instrumentalize war and, at the same time, to justify it.

The problem, however, is that war is destructive to democracy because it contributes to the development of the idea of the «Other» as the «Enemy» and thus to the establishment of a homogeneous society, one of the many examples of which is the history of Japanese Americans during World War II. Of course, from Carl Schmitt's point of view, such uniformity is precisely a prerequisite for democracy (Schmitt, 1985: p. 9). But it is obvious that the model of democracy he advocates is the opposite of the model of deliberative democracy. The latter is based on the inevitability of disagreement because the democratic process is, as Jürgen Habermas says, «a tide of dissent» (Flut von Dissensen) (Habermas, 2022: p. 109), that is, it assumes maximum openness to the realization of civil rights and liberties. From an eschatological point of view, the risks associated with threats to democracy during war are justified by the hope for a future democratic world. But the perspective that Günther Anders's idea of a «naked apocalypse» (nackten Apokalypse) or an «apocalypse without Kingdom» (Apokalypse ohne Reich) (Anders, 1972) opens up, that is, the view of war as devoid of an eschatological sense, is much more fair. If the destruction war causes is not followed by the construction of a new world, then the task is not to achieve democracy in war but to preserve democracy at war. This task is all the more justified because democracies have shown that they are not weak regimes. The eschatological position discourages because it gives hope. But the change of perspective, even if it deprives us of this hope, opens up the possibility of a new understanding of the problem of democracy and war.

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ДЕБАТИ ПРО ВІЙНУ ТА ДЕМОКРАТІЮ

З середини 1970-х років предметом особливої уваги соціальних дослідників стали
питання про те, чи гарантує демократія мир, чи потрібно жертвувати свободою в
ім'я безпеки під час війни, як можливий стабільний мир, які загрози несе війна
демократії. Саме в цей час під впливом ідей Імануеля Канта та Девіда Г'юма
формується гіпотеза демократичного миру, в основі якої лежить уявлення про те,
що демократії між собою не воюють. Предметом розгляду в цій статті стали
теоретична дискусія, пов'язана з цією гіпотезою, а також суперечки з приводу
питання про те, чи впливає тип політичного режиму на успіх держави у війні.
Дослідження теоретичних дебатів дало змогу побачити, що прихильники гіпотези
демократичного миру так і не змогли навести переконливих доказів безпосереднього
зв'язку типу політичного режиму й готовності ініціювати війну або підтримувати
мир. Разом із тим, під час дебатів було спростовано й інше усталене переконання, а
саме — у військовій слабкості демократій.

У статті зазначається, що в основі теоретичного підходу до вивчення проблеми
війни та демократії, який є панівним, лежить есхатологічне уявлення про майбутній
демократичний світ. На противагу цьому уявленню, наголошується, що більш
справедливим та виправданим був би підхід, перспективу якого відкриває ідея
Ґюнтера Андерса про «апокаліпсис без Царства», тобто, що за руйнуваннями, що їх
несе війна, не слідує побудова нового світу. Відповідно, головним завданням тоді
стає не досягнення демократії у війні, а збереження демократії під час війни.

Ключові слова: *демократія, авторитаризм, війна, Кант, демократичний мир.*