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RECEPTION IN PHILOSOPHY

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Oxana YOSYPENKO,

Doctor of Sciences in Philosophy,

Leading Research Fellow at the Department of History of Philosophy,

H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, NAS of Ukraine,

4, Triokhsviatytska St., Kyiv, 01001

o.sengulier@ukr.net

<http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3318-4788>

RECEPTION IN PHILOSOPHY AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON: AN ATTEMPT AT THEORISATION

The article conceptualizes the phenomenon of reception of foreign philosophical trends and authors as a social phenomenon that demands a socio-historical approach. The author attempts to demonstrate the advantages of such a genre of the history of philosophy as the history of reception. The merit of the socio-historical approach to reception, according to the author, lies in its ability to elucidate factors hidden from a purely exegetical approach. It allows for the explanation of phenomena that are unexplained from an exegetical perspective, such as the effects of misreading and misunderstanding during the borrowing of foreign philosophical production. These effects are not random but systematic. The author also seeks to clarify Hans Joas's formulated paradox: during reception, misunderstandings arise not only between irreconcilable positions but also between similar ones.

The author focuses on the «agents» of reception, which include not only professional philosophers but also translators, publishers, commentators, whose perspectives are always shaped by their position in the social and professional space. This space has its disciplinary, ideological, and national limitations. Based on the analysis of texts from representatives of reception histories, the article formulates key elements of reception theory. Reception is viewed as a social, structured,

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and transformative phenomenon measured by its impacts. The article also establishes connections between types and periods of reception, each having its own purpose and logic.

The article analyzes the conditions for the international circulation of ideas and demonstrates how factors of intellectual, ideological, political, and national character determine both appropriation (successful reception) and rejection of foreign trends or authors.

Keywords: *reception, socio-historical conditions of reception, philosophical field, field structure, contra-sense, logic of appropriation, logic of extraversion.*

The ways of writing the history of philosophy have been the subject of ancient and inexhaustible debates. In recent decades, sociological and historical research on philosophy, philosophical texts, concepts, and figures has seen unprecedented growth. Many authors who employ a socio-historical approach in the field of the history of philosophy utilize the term «reception» — for instance, Michael Pollack, Louis Pinto, Matthieu Hauchecorne, Romain Pudal, Hans Jonas, among many others. It can even be argued that a genre of reception history is emerging, which is a subtype of intellectual history aimed at illuminating the socio-historical conditions of the interpretation and dissemination of ideas, aspects often overlooked by purely exegetical approaches.

This trend has also influenced Ukrainian historico-philosophical scholarship, notably the journal «Philosophical Thought,» which dedicated a special thematic issue (No. 2, 2020) to reception and influence. In this issue, Serhii Yosypenko (Yosypenko, S., 2020) and Vitalii Terletsy (Terletsy, 2020) focused on the significance of reception phenomena and their impact on the history of philosophy, as well as on the reconstruction of specific aspects of idea exchange within intellectual creativity. In my article, however, I would like to instead focus on the social aspect of the reception of ideas, specifically on the effects of reception and influence within the philosophical community. While working on the reception of F. Nietzsche in French philosophical thought, who transitioned from a thinker primarily of interest to literary critics to an almost «sacred» philosopher, I was compelled to question the reasons behind such a radical change in the attitude towards the work of the German philosopher. This change cannot be explained merely by a shift in interpretative procedures, and the question boils down to how Nietzsche suddenly moved from the periphery of the French philosophical field to its very center. Similarly, the study of the French reception of Wittgenstein¹ led me to a similar paradox — Wittgenstein, practically unknown in the early 1960s, became the most fashionable philosopher in France by the 2000s, a «common good» from which representatives of opposing directions draw to criticize each other. The identification of such paradoxes forced me to turn to socio-historical studies of the phenomenon of reception, which reconstruct the configurations of national philosophical spaces with their obviousnesses, traditions, boundaries, perceived by the actors as proper, and invisibly yet convincingly shape their philosophical or intellectual preferences. Shifts in the national frameworks of philosophizing lead to the point where «transparent,» «invisible» thinkers become philosophical classics, fashionable and omnipresent. Approaches undertaken in the genre of the history of

¹ See: (Yosypenko, O., 2020; Yosypenko, Donduk, 2020; Yosypenko, O., 2021).

reception provided me with methodological tools for analyzing these widespread and quite paradoxical phenomena.

The goal of the history of reception is to clarify the possibilities and modalities of the international circulation of ideas, to reveal the factors and filters that create barriers to their circulation, to reconstruct the national, ideological, and political contexts of the interpretations of foreign authors' works, and to elucidate the interests related to the reception. As the French historian of philosophy François Azouvi notes, «to make the history of ideas philosophical and the history of philosophy historical means to open philosophy to what I call the 'global cultural fact'; it means investigating the way in which a philosophical doctrine circulates within a given culture, what it produces in it, the philosophemes it introduces into circulation, and which everyone can freely use in whatever way they wish» (Azouvi, 1992: p. 18). The life of ideas, including philosophical ones, is largely determined and structured by the socio-historical context, and studying this context is essential when it comes to the international circulation of ideas. At the same time, the development of the genre of the history of reception has led to the emergence of authors who attempt to combine the socio-historical approach to intellectual production with the analysis of the content of texts (C. Van Dam², P. Hadot³), thereby avoiding accusations of overusing the «external approach to the history of ideas as opposed to the «internal,» purely exegetical, approach.

Important principles of the history of reception have been formulated and developed by the sociology of philosophy of P. Bourdieu, L. Pinto, and J.-L. Fabiani, the sociology of intellectual networks of Randall Collins, the history of intellectual professions by Andrew Abbott, the intellectual history of the Cambridge School (Quentin Skinner, John Pocock), as well as the historical-philosophical studies of P. Hadot, the author of an original reception of ancient philosophy in the modern world (Hadot, 2017). In this article, we will attempt to propose several elements of a theory of reception, primarily based on the research of the founders of the socio-historical approach to philosophical texts, P. Bourdieu and J.-L. Fabiani⁴, as well as the studies of Hans Joas, Michael Pollack, Louis Pinto, and Romain Pudal. These authors have offered their own histories of reception — of German thinkers, M. Weber and F. Nietzsche, in France (Pollack and Pinto) and of American pragmatism in Germany and France (Joas and Pudal). Our task in this article will be to clarify the phenomenon of reception as a socio-historical phenomenon, to identify its main features and criteria, and to address the question of the conditions of possibility for intellectual cosmopolitanism.

Main Elements of the Theory of Reception

Pierre Bourdieu's brief text, «Social Conditions of the International Circulation of Ideas,» is primarily aimed against the simplistic notion of the life of ideas as akin to the life of viruses, which face no national or cultural boundaries. According to Bourdieu,

² See: (Van Damme, 2002)

³ See: (Hadot, 2020: p. 68).

⁴ See: (Fabiani, 2010).

intellectual life is not spontaneously and directly international: «Intellectual life, like all other social spaces, is a place of nationalisms and imperialisms, and intellectuals, like everyone else, are bearers of prejudices, stereotypes, assimilated ideas, overly general and simplified notions that are fueled by the contingencies of everyday life, misunderstandings, and miscomprehensions.» (Bourdieu, 2002: p. 5). Bourdieu views international intellectual life in terms of the import-export of ideas, and the activity of exporting and importing is always interested, implying profits and interests. The economic vocabulary Bourdieu employs to analyze intellectual activity is a distinctive feature of his approach, quite unusual but effective. The profits and interests in question are not purely personal or individual; they are structural interests of those who strengthen their professional positions by importing foreign texts or by exporting their own texts beyond the national culture. At the same time, the import of ideas always encounters resistance in the culture that receives them; reception is a process of overcoming obstacles. As Michael Pollack, the author of the history of the reception of Max Weber in France, noted, «if the scientific field is a place of competitive struggle aimed at establishing a monopoly on scientific authority, a foreign work necessarily encounters resistance to the extent that it can shake the existing order and balance of power between schools and groups and their competing interpretations of reality» (Pollack, 1988: p. 199). Despite this, there are always actors interested in disrupting this equilibrium, who strengthen their positions by using the ideas and works of foreign authors as weapons in the struggle against opponents in their own scientific, literary, or philosophical culture.

This *structural* character of reception also signifies its *instrumental* nature—reception is not a neutral process. The structural interests that drive it lead to the distortion of the meanings of concepts, philosophemes, and positions of the borrowed authors. There is a temptation to assert that the international circulation of ideas primarily consists of misunderstandings regarding the meaning and significance of borrowed concepts and theories, a lack of comprehension of the theoretical and historical context that situates these ideas, which is generally unknown to the «intermediaries» who introduce and disseminate them, and an ignorance of the institutional, intellectual, and political positions of the authors they import. Geographical distance, often coupled with historical distance, leads to numerous misunderstandings. Nevertheless, these misunderstandings have the merit of shedding light on the principles of functioning and the *a priori* assumptions inherent in a particular intellectual field. The «exotic» effect of a theory prompts those who notice it to reflect on their own intellectual and professional habitus, which is heavily determined by the interests and regulatory principles of the field to which they belong. In other words, a dialogue with a foreigner encourages making explicit what usually remains implicit: intellectual references perceived as necessary, theoretical figures considered legitimate or illegitimate, and ethical and political positions regarded as acceptable or unacceptable. All these elements are «self-evident» in the national space and almost never become subjects of discourse because they are generally not consciously recognized by the actors. As E. Durkheim said, the unconscious is history, and elucidating the socio-historical background of the basic assumptions of a culture — the culture that performs the reception and the

culture from which the text or direction originates — is one of the important tasks of the history of reception.

«Texts travel without their contexts.» This well-known phrase belongs to K. Marx, but it was Bourdieu who made it famous, turning it into a fundamental principle of reception studies. The distorting nature of reception stems from the mechanism of decontextualization and recontextualization that any text undergoes as it enters another culture. Decontextualization is accompanied by the loss of its original meaning and sense, while recontextualization seeks to imbue it with new meaning in the recipient culture. As Gérard Mauger notes, «those who receive texts and ideas generally ignore their meaning and function in the field of origin and reinterpret them spontaneously depending on the structure of the field of reception» (Mauger, 2009: p. 70). This structural complexity of the processes of decontextualization and recontextualization, inherent in the circulation of ideas, can be key to explaining many conflicting interpretations and seemingly unmotivated misunderstandings, such as those encapsulated in expressions like «French Nietzsche,» «Bergsonian pragmatism,» «Canadian Rawls,» or «Russian Bourdieu.» Andrew Abbott, in his sociology of intellectual professions, pays significant attention to so-called «intermediaries»—translators, publishers, and commentators. It is they who, often unnoticed, make possible the hermeneutic situation of the «meeting of minds,» where the reader engages with a text that has, nevertheless, already undergone certain stages of *appropriation* by the recipient culture and has been subjected to numerous transformations and changes. Therefore, one cannot think in binary terms: new ideas, solely based on their content, either face rejection from those holding opposing intellectual positions or receive support from those with similar intellectual stances. Hans Joas, in his study of misunderstandings between German philosophy and American pragmatism, demonstrated that this is not the case: «misunderstandings arise not only with those whose positions are irreconcilable with pragmatism but also with those who hold similar positions» (Joas, 1993: p. 95). These misunderstandings are explained by the fact that texts and ideas inevitably pass through the «distorting prism» of the issues and interests of the field of reception. Bourdieu provides two eloquent examples of misunderstandings associated with the phenomena of decontextualization and recontextualization. The first example is the reading by German thinkers of French authors, which he borrows from Marx. The author of the «Manifesto of the Communist Party» mentions in passing that German thinkers have problems understanding texts by French authors, which they perceive as «pure texts,» as works of a transcendental subject, while they are expressions of the political conjuncture of political actors. This gap between the contexts leads to misunderstandings, and the more distant commentators are from the context of the work's origin, the greater the gap and the greater the likelihood of distortion.

Bourdieu's second example is an example of the deforming nature of recontextualisation and concerns the seemingly inexplicable popularity of Heidegger in France in the 1950s. The Germans, he notes, were very surprised that French philosophers of that period were so interested in Heidegger. This fact becomes understandable if we take into account the complete and undivided dominance of Sartre in the French

intellectual environment in the 1950s. The main function of Heidegger's reception in this situation was to «localise» and disqualify Sartre. Philosophy professors said: «All of Sartre is in Heidegger, and in the best possible form.» Jean Beaufret, a teacher at the Lycée Henry IV and translator of Heidegger, gained the authority of a quasi-philosopher by importing Heidegger to France. With Heidegger's help, his French interpreters tried to create competition for Sartre's existentialism in the national philosophical space and secure their own philosophical capital by redistributing spheres of influence.

To describe the national philosophical space, Bourdieu uses the terms «context» and «field». In fact, a structured context is nothing but a field. The field, one of the fundamental terms of Bourdieu's sociology, is an oppositional structure of the environment, intellectual, artistic, national, with its own oppositions and compulsions that determine the different positions of actors and determine their competition⁵. The actors who import texts and movements are always rooted in their national field and reinterpret the imported ideas according to its needs. The logic of recontextualisation legitimises a strange situation, from the point of view of the «pure» history of ideas, when it is not what the author said but what he is forced to say that matters, because a foreign author in the field of reception must perform a certain function, otherwise the reception will simply not take place. For example, the interpretation of Nietzsche in the 1960s and 1970s by French philosophers, primarily M. Foucault and J. Deleuze, provoked severe criticism from German philosophers, in particular, J. Habermas. In this regard, Bourdieu notes that Habermas and Foucault both had a critical intention, and if Habermas were in Foucault's shoes, he would probably do exactly what he criticised Foucault for. Instead of resenting the way Deleuze and Foucault use Nietzsche, we need to understand the function that Nietzsche, and specifically Nietzsche's «Genealogy of Morals», could perform in a philosophical field dominated by subjectivism and spiritualism. In those conditions, the «Genealogy of Morals» allowed for the legitimisation of the old scientist, even positivist, demarche that is the social history of ideas. It was through the use of Nietzschean genealogy that Foucault was able to oppose the dominant anti-historical rationalism of French historical epistemology with a historical science of historical rationalities. His structural epistemology with the idea of «genealogy» and the concept of «episteme» contextualised ideas in a cultural context, ideas lost their extra-historical character and gained meaning in the cultural configuration to which they belonged. At the same time, Foucault's structural epistemology was accused of relativism, because epistemes were understood as closed systems with their own internal rationality, separated from each other by radical ruptures, and each idea made sense only in a certain historical configuration. Foucault, thus, with the help of Nietzsche, contributed to the development of the history of ideas, but this contribution, seen from Germany, looked like a restoration of irrationalism, against which the philosophical projects of J. Habermas and K.-O. Apel were directed. According to Bourdieu, Habermas and Foucault are quite close in their structural positions, they are critical of the situation in their national philosophical field, even if their positions

⁵ See: (Bourdieu, 2024: pp. 213—220), and also as regards Bourdieu's terminology: (Yosypenko, O., Yosypenko, S., 2021).

seem, at first glance, to be opposite. The mismatch of national contexts, the field of production and the field of reception can thus create the impression of the closeness of different positions and the incompatibility of close positions. At the same time, from the point of view of reception theory, in order to understand the fortunes of a foreign author or movement in the recipient culture, the study of the field of reception of ideas is more important than the field of their production.

We can thus identify another constitutive feature of reception that distinguishes it from mere interpretation: reception is important for its *effects*, it is always on the side of the *influence* of ideas or positions, not what the author of ideas or texts had in mind. This is not a question of ideological convergence with Stanley Fish's hermeneutic of reception, for which the text precedes the context and is created by a plurality of readings, and the reader of the text is thus transformed into co-authors of the meaning of the text. The socio-historical approach to the analysis of philosophical texts is, in this sense, anti-hermeneutic; there are no texts without contexts, and intellectual cosmopolitanism is possible only when interpreters are able to understand the function of a text in its own context and reconstruct all the factors that distort its meaning in the field of reception. Reception is not an individual interpretation, it is a collective phenomenon that involves a chain that starts from the author of the text, goes through the reading (translation, interpretation) of the text and reaches its «effects», and it is the presence of «effects» in the form of appropriation, incorporation of the author in a new culture, that is the measure of reception. Only when a foreign author has an impact on another culture of philosophy can we speak of the success of his reception. In the early twentieth century, American pragmatism was very well known in France, the works of its main representatives were translated, and it provoked extremely lively debates. However, the reaction of the philosophical community to pragmatism was rather negative, the works devoted to it were critical, and the boom of pragmatism at the beginning of the century ended in its complete oblivion almost by the end of the century. The reception of pragmatism in French philosophy, despite the success of the first stages of reception, never took place, because it failed to find its place in this culture and to be incorporated into it (Pudal, 2023: p. 42).

Translation, therefore, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for reception. Given that the criterion of reception is the appropriation of a foreign author, translation is the first step on this path, which cannot be overestimated, but at the same time cannot be underestimated. Sometimes it happens that the ideas and concepts of a certain author appear before the translations of their works. Such a situation is most conducive to misunderstandings, which is well illustrated by the first receptions of L. Wittgenstein and J. Rawls in France. The first translation of the Austrian philosopher's «Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus» and «Philosophical Investigations» took place in France in 1961, almost 40 years after the publication of the «Tractatus» and 10 years after the publication of the «Philosophical Investigations». Wittgenstein's ideas were well known in paraphrases, and thus, having passed through many interpretations, they led to the establishment of two stereotypical images of Wittgenstein: first, as a representative of logical positivism, and second, as a representative of the ordinary language philosophy. However, both identifications were wrong. Wittgenstein's true reception in France be-

gan only when his ideas were finally separated from both the context of neo-positivism and Cambridge philosophy. Similarly, Rawls, who entered French academic thought rather late, only after his works were translated, appeared first in the media and political space, and was interpreted alternately as a social democrat and a neoliberal, depending on the position that was being attempted to be defended by one of his well-known concepts. It was only in the late 1990s, after the translation of Rawls's main works, that Rawls the philosopher was discovered and a circle of researchers emerged, including those studying his epistemology and ethical issues. The philosophical reception of Rawls was complicated by the fact that it was burdened with interpretations borrowed from other French-speaking environments, primarily Belgium and Canada, where, with the help of Rawls' concepts, they tried to solve internal problems, in particular, the problems of multiculturalism, which were not very relevant for French thought. The «French» Rawls, therefore, was significantly different from the «Belgian» or «Canadian» Rawls, because in each national culture he performed a different function, determined by its own needs and problems. Translations, therefore, are the first condition for an author's reception by the professional community. In this environment, his ideas are also subject to deformation, but it cannot be formed without knowledge of these ideas, because it is formed by a circle of exegetes who compete for the best interpretation of this author and must be understood in the context of his work. In Max Weber's terminology, it is a «corps of priests» who have the right to interpret the doctrine and transmit it.

The appeal to translation is intended to reaffirm the social nature of reception. Translation is not the work of one person. Someone can certainly make a translation for themselves and use it, as P. Hadot did when he translated Wittgenstein's «Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus» for his own use. However, a published translation that functions in the public space is a matter of coordinating many social operations: selection by the publisher, approval, inclusion in a series, «appropriation» by the translator and commentator. The first operation is selection: what is translated? who publishes? who translates? The procedure of entering the public space through publishing, presentation, advertising in bookstores, through the name of the translator and whoever writes the preface or afterword to the publication is a well-structured operation that requires the interaction of many actors with their respective competences. When we have a translation of X, Bourdieu emphasises, we have not only text X, but this text with a preface Y, which represents the work of the former, adapting it to its own vision, and, in any case, to the issues included in the field of reception. Along with the inclusion in a particular collection, thanks to the commentary and the preface, based on the content of the preface, and depending on the position in the professional environment of the person who writes the preface, we get a whole series of transformations or even deformations of the original message. The *reading* of the translated work must also be included in this social operation, because readers also apply to it categories of perception and issues that are products of their own field.

Thus, we can consider the context of reception as a competitive space of power relations, in which reception becomes a way to support an existing position or strengthen a marginal position. Quite often, the importation of a foreign author fits into the

logic of mutual reinforcement of actors with similar positions in national academic spaces. This was the case with the «cross-legitimation» of P. Bourdieu and R. Schusterman in the 1980s, or A. Bergson and W. James in the early twentieth century. The publication of a text that is close and understandable to the «intermediary», written in a style that he likes, can strengthen his position, even if he has no expectation of making a «profit». The logic of strengthening the position is not a conscious manipulation, it is structural and can even function in the opposite direction, when the actor has a marginal position in his professional field. In this case, in order to strengthen it, he can use the authority of a recognised author in another tradition, even if this deforms his position. This was the case with the reception of Wittgenstein in France, when the first proponents of French analytic philosophy positioned him as a typical representative of the latter, while he was its critic. Again, this is not a case of deliberate manipulation. Differences between different traditions, intellectual fields and social spaces are so significant that transformations and deformations associated with the use of foreign texts and authors become almost inevitable.

Finally, we have to emphasize the *national* character of reception, which means that in the process of receiving a foreign author or movement, the entire social and cultural field, with its fundamental oppositions and its historical unconscious, is involved in a global way. The task of socio-historical analysis is to reveal all these oppositions that are created and reproduced by the functioning of the educational institutions of society, and which are the «key» to understanding it. E. Durkheim, M. Mauss and C. Lévi-Strauss described primitive forms of classification of archaic societies without educational institutions, which are oppositions of dry and wet, east and west, raw and cooked, etc. Differentiated societies have their own categories of understanding, which educational and cultural institutions are designed to produce and reproduce. As an example of the problem caused by fundamental national cultural oppositions, Bourdieu cites the interaction between the German and French philosophical fields. The latter, due to their historical systemic interaction, use the same oppositional structure, but give it a different meaning: it is the Culture-Civilisation structure, typical of the German academic environment, at least until the Second World War. This opposition was intended to separate the German tradition, noble and authentic, from the French tradition, flamboyant and superficial. This opposition of the deep and serious to the glittering and superficial can also be recognised in the opposition between content and form, thought and feeling, reason and style, and finally between philosophy and philology (literature). The French academic tradition is also characterised by this opposition, but using it, it turns the pros into cons and vice versa: depth becomes heaviness, seriousness becomes school pedantry, superficiality becomes French clarity: G. Deleuze, who criticised the idea of depth in philosophy, said that the most superficial thing is the skin, and that is where everything important happens. Some German intellectuals, who were looking for an antidote in French thought to what they did not like in German thought, found the same inverted structure in it: «Heidegger and Alain are the same thing, only in a different national version» (Bourdieu, 2002: p. 6), Bourdieu notes. Freedom from the compulsions of national thought can only be achieved through a painstaking re-

construction of national compulsions and oppositions, and even this work does not completely free one from them but provides a certain independence from them.

The situation with the reception of pragmatism in France illustrates the role of the national factor well and confirms Bourdieu's thesis, which we have already mentioned: in order to understand the different fates of theories and texts, the context of reception is as important, if not more important, than the context of their production in one's own culture. In the case of pragmatism, it seems clear that national interests, both theoretical and ideological, have been much more important than issues related to American pragmatism as a philosophical movement. On the one hand, we are talking about the internal French theoretical and ideological debate around Cartesianism, rationalism, intellectualism and positivism, which was influenced by the ideas of Ch.S. Peirce, W. James and J. Dewey; on the other hand, we are talking about the ideological and political situation of the Third Republic, the Republic of Teachers and Scholars, which turned the question of rationalism into a question of the official ideology of the Republic. As Romain Pudal, a researcher of the reception of pragmatism in France, writes, «the debate on pragmatism mixes very different levels of argumentation and triggers debates on issues more important than the Peircean maxim» (Pudal, 2011: p. 750). At the beginning of the 20th century, there was an actual reception of pragmatism, evidenced by the numerous translations of texts by James and Dewey, as well as the emergence of countless articles in philosophical journals dedicated to pragmatism. This first and, to some extent, the second type of reception allows us to talk about the *meeting* of French thought with pragmatism, but the real *influence* is obviously not in question here. Authors who write about pragmatism are not overly concerned with understanding a foreign movement; their assessments of pragmatism show little theoretical interest in its ideas, and no friendly critical exegesis. What is important is not a good knowledge of pragmatic texts and authors, but the possibility of using their guidance as a weapon in a national intellectual field divided and organised by its own challenges and problems. These latter are the subject of discussions, even if they are conducted using the names of pragmatists, references to their works and well-known philosophical topics, such as the formulation of the problem of truth in pragmatism, or pragmatic criticism of philosophical essentialism and foundationalism. Without immersing oneself in the very tense atmosphere of pragmatism's reception in France, it is difficult to understand the positions of its critics and its few supporters. This is the case when a foreign trend did not overcome the filters of national issues, ideological, political and theoretical, and had no chance to influence French philosophical culture.

Types of receptions

In general, we can distinguish several stages and even types of reception of an author or a movement in the recipient culture: *passive* reading, *active* reading, and *constructive* reading. The first type of reception involves the translation of works and their first comments, in particular, in prefaces or afterwords to translated texts. The second type of reception involves writing articles and books about foreign authors or movements,

when the latter are no longer the goal of these texts, but become the starting point of the writer's own reflections or legitimations, such as the phrases «X (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, pragmatism, etc.) makes it possible to understand», «X confirms the conclusions», «X legitimates the question», «X opens up space for rethinking the problem», etc. The third type of reception, constructive or creative, occurs when the person who receives a foreign author's texts makes his or her concepts instruments of their own thought and uses them to solve problems of their own tradition or professional field. In the latter case, we have «appropriation», the incorporation of the author or foreign tradition and the fact of their influence on the recipient's culture. According to this classification, Nietzsche and Heidegger had a real impact on French thought, their reception was real, their uses were creative⁶, while pragmatism, with its pronounced national character, its focus on criticism of European philosophy and anti-intellectualism, caused mainly a flurry of criticism and did not lead to *constructive* uses.

Conclusions

In this article, we have tried to clarify what the phenomenon of reception is and what we can expect from such a historical and philosophical genre as the history of reception. The history of reception belongs to the family of contextualist approaches, and its specificity is determined by the understanding of the context as socio-historical, not just intellectual, as, for example, in the intellectual history of the Cambridge School. Reception proceeds from the insufficiency of the hermeneutic approach and considers the hermeneutic situation as the final stage of reception and excludes the approaches of intellectual cosmopolitanism. The main task of reception is to explain the facts that are inexplicable from a purely exegetical point of view, including the possibility of interpreting a certain foreign author or movement in the opposite senses in the philosophical field of the recipient's culture. One example of this approach is the reception of Wittgenstein in France in the 1980s, when the Austrian philosopher ideas were used to criticise postmodernism and, at the same time, by postmodernists themselves, to criticise Heideggerianism and by Heideggerians themselves, to criticise phenomenology and by phenomenologists themselves, to strengthen their own positions. This phenomenon becomes understandable in view of the logic of reception described by François Bayart as a logic of appropriation or «extraversion», which consists in «mobilising ideas and concepts of foreign authors to solve autochthonous problems» (Bayart, 1996: p. 42). As a result, the author's image in a foreign culture may not be similar to their image in their own culture, the culture of origin, and may have «different faces» in the recipient culture of the same period⁷.

We have also tried to identify the constitutive elements of the theory of reception, which assumes that reception is always an interpretation, but a specific interpretation. *Firstly*, it is a collective, social phenomenon, because it is about the interaction of cultural

⁶ About types of reception see: (Yosypenko, O., 2016a, pp. 75-80).

⁷ About «Deleuze's Nietzsche», «Foucault's Nietzsche» and «Derrida's Nietzsche» see: (Pinto, 1995: p. 97); see also: (Yosypenko, O., 2016a).

traditions, about the entry of an author, a text, a foreign trend into a collective identity — national, professional, cultural. *Secondly*, reception is an interpretation in which the influence of the author (text, tradition) on the recipient culture is important. The term «reception» is obviously a neologism of German origin and means «acceptance» or «fortune» of an author or text; it was widespread within the paradigm of the receptive aesthetics of Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser. From the very beginning, this term emphasised the process of reading and its consequences, contrary to the myth of the author, creativity, and original message. Reception is always on the side of the recipient of the message and implies a model with three elements: the author of the message, the message itself (his works), and the recipient-receiver who reacts to the message (the works). We would like to emphasise that this sense of understanding reception is still relevant: reaction is a necessary element of reception in the international circulation of ideas. At the same time, the reaction can vary from rejection to the author's real influence on the recipient's culture, and this difference in reaction is largely explained by the *third* feature of reception: it is a structured phenomenon. Structural factors are responsible for deformations of the meaning of a text, message, position, as well as for misunderstandings and, in P. Hadot's terminology, contra-senses. If we are aware of these factors, we can avoid them and facilitate the international life of ideas, both scientific and philosophical.

To comprehend them means, first of all, to analyse the unthinkable of culture, its schemes of perception and thought, which influence the bearers of culture against their will; it also means to analyse the compulsions of the field of idea production, philosophical, scientific, literary, intellectual, national, etc. If we do this, we can understand the meaning and function of the text in its own context; if not, we interpret it based on our own structural needs and interests, and the possibility of misunderstanding and distortion of meaning is greater the further we are from the original context. The history of reception proves that in cultures in which there was an orientation towards objective analysis of a foreign text, author or movement, in cultures in which a field of specialists, a «corps of priests» was formed, for whom their own meaning of the text and its context mattered, reception did take place, the imported text, author, movement entered a new culture and began to work in it, causing not only a fashion effect, but also changing styles and ways of philosophising and thinking.

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Оксана ЙОСИПЕНКО,

доктор філософських наук,

провідний науковий співробітник відділу історії зарубіжної філософії,

Інститут філософії імені Г.С. Сковороди НАН України,

01001, Київ, вул. Трьохсвятительська, 4

o.sengulier@ukr.net

<http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3318-4788>

РЕЦЕПЦІЯ ЯК СОЦІАЛЬНИЙ ФЕНОМЕН: СПРОБА ТЕОРЕТИЗАЦІЇ

Авторка статті концептуалізує феномен рецепції іноземних філософських напрямків та авторів як соціальний феномен, який вимагає соціоісторичного підходу, та намагається продемонструвати переваги такого жанру історії філософії, як історія рецепції. Заслугу соціоісторичного підходу до рецепції авторка вбачає в тому, що він оприявнює чинники, приховані від суто екзегетичного підходу, і дає змогу пояснити феномени, непояснювані з екзегетичного погляду, зокрема ефекти *misreading* та *misunderstanding* під час запозичення іноземної філософської продукції, які не є випадковими, а є системними, та прояснити сформульований Гансом Йоасом парадокс: під час рецепції непорозуміння виникають як між непримиренними позиціями, так і між схожими. Авторка зосереджується на «дієвцях» рецепції, до числа яких належать не лише професійні філософи, а й перекладачі, видавці, коментатори, погляд яких завжди визначається їхньою позицією в соціальному і професійному просторі, що має свої обмеження дисциплінарного, ідеологічного та національного характеру. На підставі аналізу текстів представників історій рецепції у статті сформульовано ключові елементи теорії рецепції, рецепція розглядається як соціальний, структурований та трансформаційний феномен, вимірюваний своїми впливами, а також встановлюється зв'язок типів та періодів рецепції, кожен з яких має свою мету і свою логіку. У статті проаналізовано умови можливості міжнародного обігу ідей і показано, яким чином фактори інтелектуального, ідеологічного, політичного та національного характеру визначають, з одного боку, привласнення, імплантацію, тобто успішну рецепцію, а з іншого — відкидання іноземного напрямку чи автора.

Ключові слова: рецепція, соціоісторичні умови рецепції, філософське поле, структура поля, контрсенс, логіка привласнення, логіка екстраверсії.