TY - JOUR AU - Descombes, Vincent PY - 2021/01/16 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - First person philosophy: Modern philosophy of mind: prospects for development JF - Filosofska Dumka JA - Fildumka VL - IS - 6 SE - TOPIC OF THE ISSUE DO - UR - https://dumka.philosophy.ua/index.php/fd/article/view/498 SP - 16-26 AB - <p>The report is devoted to the problem of psychological propositions in the first person singular, in which the philosophy of Mind sees evidence of the existence of the subject, Self, Ego, which the speaker, speaking of himself, denotes by the pronoun « I ». Commenting keywords on the texts of Locke, Leibniz, Descartes and James, the speaker reconstructs the theses of the philosophy of Mind and demonstrates its paradoxes. Using the achievements of the linguistic turn in the phi- losophy of mind, in particular, the grammatical reflections of L. Wittgenstein and E. Enscomb, Descombes detects the assumption of a paradox of reflection, the rejection of which leads to its disappearance: the infallibility of psychological utterances in the first person singular is explained not by the cognitive contact of the subject with himself, but by the fact that there is no one who could be wrong, because « I » does not call anyone, « I » is not a name.</p> ER -