TY - JOUR AU - Vasylchenko, Andriy PY - 2021/01/16 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Intersubjective approach to intentionality and internal objects: Analytics of subjectivity and intersubjectivity JF - Filosofska Dumka JA - Fildumka VL - IS - 6 SE - TOPIC OF THE ISSUE DO - 10.15407/fd2020.06.027 UR - https://dumka.philosophy.ua/index.php/fd/article/view/499 SP - 27-41 AB - <p>Intentionality — the orientation of mental states to objects (things, properties, states of things, events) — has been considered a hallmark of the psyche since Brentano’s time. In this article, we consider the problem of intentionality from the second-person approach, or the standpoint of intersubjectivity. Our analysis shows that intentionality is intrinsically projective. The projective nature of intentionality is related to internal objects that play a crucial role in fixing the person’s subjective experience and serve as a fulcrum in the development of the person. The internal ob- ject can be treated as a set of properties and tropes. The logic of intentionality proposed by Graham Priest and the theory of primary (that is, belonging to the Freudian system «uncon- scious») psychological attitudes developed by Linda Brakel created the preconditions for seman- tical analysis of projective intentionality. In the article, we rely on the logic of projective inten- tionality that reorients the resources of modal logics and semantics of possible worlds to the in- vestigation and formalization of primary thinking. Considering the problem of mental existence within the framework of the second-person approach, we show that Wittgenstein’s reasoning about the «beetle in a box» does not refute the thesis of the privacy of mental meanings. Finally, involving the possible world semantics, we develop a neo-Aristotelian approach to the ontology of mental objects.</p> ER -