Filosofska Dumka

The debates on war and democracy

Denys KIRYUKHIN — 2024-04-01

Since the 1970s, scholars have begun to pay special attention to the questions of whether democracy guarantees peace, whether freedom should be sacrificed in the name of security during war, how sustainable peace is possible, and what threats war poses to democracy. In the same period, influenced by the legacy of Immanuel Kant and David Hume, the democratic peace hypothesis began to be developed. This article discusses the theoretical debate concerning this hypothesis, as well as the question of whether the type of political regime affects the state's success in war. An examining of the theoretical debates has shown that the proponents of the democratic peace hypothesis have not been able to provide convincing evidence of a direct link between the type of political regime and the willingness to initiate war or maintain peace. At the same time, the debate disproves another common belief, that of the military weakness of democracies.

The article notes that the prevalent theoretical approach to studying the issue of war and democracy is based on an eschatological idea of the future democratic world. In contrast to this view, Gunther Anders’ idea of an “apocalypse without a Kingdom” opens up a new perspective for understanding war and democracy, which is that the destruction that war brings is not followed by the construction of a new world. In this case, the main task is not to achieve democracy as a result of war, but to preserve democracy during war.

Pretended antinomy of historical experience: To the G.-G. Gadamer and F.R. Ankersmit interpretations of the historical experience concept

Roman ZYMOVETS — 2024-04-01

The article is devoted to the analysis of the phenomenon of historical experience in Gadamer's hermeneutics and Ankersmit's philosophical-historical concept. The interest of the philosophy of history in experience was actualized against the background of exhaustion of the heuristic potential of historical narrativism and constructivism, closely related to the so-called "linguistic turn". At first glance, Gadamer and Ankersmit are representing antinomic interpretations of historical experience: as mediated by the effects of involvement in a tradition or heritage and direct, extracontextual encounter with the past. However, the investigation proves that, despite the apparent antinomy of these approaches, the Gadamerian hermeneutic experience as an experience of the prevailing historical reality is not so far from the sublime historical experience of Ankersmit. And, on the contrary, the sublime historical experience, despite its claims to immediacy, turns out to be an experience of the finitude of human existence, that is, it is close to what Gadamer considered the essence of hermeneutic experience. In both cases, historical experience is considered as a condition for the possibility of understanding the past, and therefore, the question of the universal structure of such experience and understanding necessarily arises. The differences in the positions of the two authors stem from fundamentally different ontological prejudices that they share. For Gadamer, this is the reduction of history to a linguistically structured heritage, as a result of which most of the past falls out of hermeneutic experience. For Ankersmit, this is an uncritical understanding of time, as a result of which his concept of the sublime does not receive a reliable methodological foundation. Clarification of the temporality of the sublime historical, as well as rejection of the rigid connection between historical experience and language, open the prospect of removing the abstract antinomy of contextuality and immediacy of historical experience. The temporality of human existence turns out to be a universal prerequisite of historical experience, the two opposite forms of which are heredity and discontinuity. Contrary to the widespread criticism of Ankersmit's theory as far from historiographical practice, the development of the potential of the concept of sublime historical experience reveals its relevance to the dynamic and tragic modern history that Ukraine is currently experiencing.

Evolution of the concept of the absolute in Fiche

Olha NETREBIAK — 2024-04-01

The article offers an analysis of the concept of the Absolute in Fichte’s philosophy. Despite the difficulty of the definition, this concept receives a rich and creative rethinking in Fichte and will further influence the philosophical systems of thought. Gradually introducing this concept into his philosophical project of Wissenschaftslehre Fichte often changes its interpretation. So, starting with a somewhat vague understanding of the concept of the "absolute I" through Schelling's criticism of the Absolute, he develops the theory of the manifestation of the Absolute, each time choosing new metaphors to denote it, and sometimes filling it with religious content, when the Absolute becomes a substitute for the concept of God.

On the one hand, it’s important not to reduce the Absolute to a simple object of thought because this would indicate the limitation of the Absolute. On the other hand, it would be wrong to consider the Absolute as an empty or neutral concept or something completely enclosed in itself. Then, its existence will be doubtful. Fichte is careful about a clear definition of the Absolute. He solves this dilemma through the idea of the manifestation of the Absolute. Manifestation is the exit of the Absolute beyond itself while remaining unchanged. The ability to manifest itself is a prerequisite that the Absolute can be recognized and thought. This is how the Absolute manifests itself in the form of knowledge. Fichte emphasizes that the Absolute is not a projection of our mind, it may not depend on our thinking, however with such peculiarity that truth and knowledge have their basis in it. Thereby, with the theory of the Absolute, Fichte develops the idea of the foundation that is outside of ourselves, has transcendental character, and thus allows knowledge or truth not to be trapped in subjective tenets. Analyzing step by step the process of evolution of this concept, we will be able to see how in the last years of his life, Fichte states the importance of two realities: the “I” and the “Absolute” and how he explains the connection between them.

A short essay about my colleague

Volodymyr KUZNETSOV — 2024-04-01

The sketch contains the author's memories of some aspects of many years of communication with the outstanding Ukrainian philosopher, poet and one of the leaders of the dissident movement of the totalitarian Soviet period, Vasil’ Lisovyi (1937–2012). His active, principled moral and patriotic position is highlighted, his understanding of the tasks of creative development of Ukrainian philosophy is revealed, and attention is drawn to the social significance of the anthologies of Western intellectual thought published with his participation on issues of liberalism, conservatism and nationalism. Some actions are proposed to perpetuate his creative achievements.

The Anthropology of Performance by Victor Witter Turner (Beley, L., Butsykin, E., Kebuladze, V. (moderator), Kotsyuba, M. (translator), Ligus, M.)

Vakhtang KEBULADZE — 2024-04-01

The Anthropology of Performance by Victor Witter Turner (Beley, L., Butsykin, E., Kebuladze, V. (moderator), Kotsyuba, M. (translator), Ligus, M.)

Dialog “buddhism – western philosophy” as the reality game: An interview with dr. Jan Westerhoff

Olena KALANTAROVA — 2024-04-01

No one is surprised anymore by the dialogue between Buddhism and Western science, which develops the foundations of cognitive and contemplative sciences. But there have been requests for reflection on the results achieved, or even for a strategy for analytical research of the Buddhist East, which brings this dialogue to the philosophical level. And this level of discussion is, in fact, the dialogue between Buddhism and Western philosophy, which requires a new discourse that should be built on their common ground. And the first question that arises against this background is how to focus attention on the philosophical aspect of Buddhism, which orientalists usually call “Buddhist philosophy”. Thus, realizing the beginning of the dialogue between Buddhist and Western philosophies, we are faced with the need to take the next, but already conscious step in the direction of this discussion. In order to make this step confident, we need to know where and how to start, and what key subjects we can rely on. Therefore, in an effort to find possible warnings against gross mistakes in such discussions, we sought the help of Western experts in the field of Buddhist studies by reading their works and talking to them. One of the well-known scholars is Professor Jan Westerhoff, who kindly agreed to give me an interview and answer some questions: whether there is a Buddhist philosophy; what are the approaches and stages of its research; what are the peculiarities of using the terms of Western philosophy in these studies; what can be the criterion for the best reading of traditional Buddhist texts; what can such a discussion give to contemporary Western philosophy, etc. This interview was not intended to be a conceptual deepening of either Buddhist or Western philosophy; we only tried to identify key questions that could start a dialog between them in the right direction.

Editorial

Vitaliy Nechiporenko — 2024-04-01

Editorial

Foreword

Vitalii TERLETSKY — 2024-04-01

Foreword

Kant’s sentence of the moral law as a “fact of reason”: hermeneutical and historiographical perspectives

Vitalii TERLETSKY — 2024-04-01

Kant's well-known statement from the “Critique of Practical Reason” (§ 7) that the consciousness of the basic law of pure practical reason (or the customary/moral law) can be called a fact of reason (V, 31.24) has not yet become the subject of adequate attention of domestic researchers. In the “Critique of Practical Reason”, Kant justify his famous categorical imperative by appealing to the “fact of reason” (§ 7). A closer reading of this passage reveals that it refers to a “fundamental law of pure practical reason” and its “consciousness” is called “a fact of reason”. It is likely to think that Kant makes a “naturalistic fallacy” when he tries to justify “ought” (law) from “is” (fact). An analysis of the broader context of the use of the term “fact”, which occurs in the Critique in general 11 times, proves that its denotation is a moral law, which is explained in the corresponding train of thought. A special problem of interpretation is the explanation of the genitive in the expression “a fact of reason” [ein Factum der Vernunft]. It is common to read it as genitivus subjectivus (the fact is a product (act) of the reason, the fact arises thanks to the reason) and as genitivus objectivus (the reason itself is a fact, something factual). But from the standpoint of modern studies of Kant its reading as genitivus auctoris (Willaschek, Wolff, Noller) is promising. Kant’s specific use of the Latin form “ein Factum” in other works, which has the meaning not of “fact”, but of “imputable act” also, testifies in favor of this. Starting with Dieter Heinrich’s article “The Concept of Moral Insight and Kant’s Doctrine of the Fact of Reason” (1960), many researchers interpret the thesis of the “fact of reason” as Kant’s rejection of the attempt at the deduction of moral insight in the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral” (1785). However, as modern studies (Riedel, Wolff) show, this interpretation is not convincing enough. There are sufficient reasons to believe that it is Kant’s moral and legal doctrine of imputatio facti can explicate an enigmatic passage of the II Critique.

Kant’s analysis of the soul: correlation with the body, and the problem of existence

Viktor KOZLOVSKYI — 2024-04-01

The article highlights the conceptual issues related to Kant’s analysis of the soul, a concept of utmost importance for the metaphysics and psychology of German academic philosophy (Schulphilosophie) of the Enlightenment was significantly dependent on the developed and systematically presented philosophical and scientific ideas and concepts of Christian Wolff. Kantian philosophy, its themes, and conceptual language were formed in the crucible of Wolfean discourse, and from the early 1770s in the struggle against it, which led to the emergence of a new, critical philosophy – transcendental idealism, in which the problem of the soul, consciousness, and self-awareness became fundamental. It is this issue that was thoroughly covered in the «Critique of Pure Reason» and other works that were published later, after the first Critique. The article draws attention to Kant’s Lectures, which, on the one hand, demonstrate his critical attitude towards the so-called Wolfians, their metaphysics, and psychology, and, on the other hand, the lecture materials illustrate Kant's new conceptual position, and, what is important, develop, supplement and clarify it. The sources of Kant’s lectures are highlighted, taking into account the fact that we have at our disposal lecture notes, the authors of which are either unknown or, if known, their authorship is still somewhat doubtful, since they are notes that different people have rewritten. The article analyses lecture notes on psychology, the authors of which are more or less well-known, and experts recognize these notes as quite valid. The conceptual content of these lectures allows us to look at Kant’s understanding of the problem of the soul in a somewhat broader context compared to the «Critique of Pure Reason», where this problem is analyzed in connection with the paralogisms of reason and the transcendental deduction of categories. In his lectures on psychology, Kant draws attention to the problem of the interaction of the soul with the human body, the «location of the soul», linking it not so much to the organs of the human body (for example, the head) as to the location of a person as a bodily being in the world makes all acts of consciousness, self-awareness, and sense perception possible. Kant emphasizes the basic importance of such a spatial location of a person for the soul, as something that belongs to a person with a certain integrity, and not a separate organ, to act properly, to perform its cognitive functions. The article analyses the problem of existence, which is important for critical philosophy, its various modalities, and predication, with a special emphasis on the problem of the existence of metaphysical objects - the soul, God, and the world as a whole.

Recht ohne Ethik? Kant über die Gründe, das Recht nicht zu brechen

Vitalii TERLETSKY — 2024-04-01

Marcus Willaschek

Як професор філософії Нового часу з 2003 року, доктор Маркус Вілашек викладає в Інституті філософії Франкфуртського університету імені Ґете (Франкфурт-на-Майні, Німеччина). Сфера його інтересів зосереджена, зокрема, на етиці, філософії права та історії філософії, а головними дослідницькими царинами є філософія Канта, метафізика і теорія пізнання. М. Вілашек є одним із найвідоміших дослідників філософії Канта в Німеччині. Він є автором низки монографій про практичну філософію і метафізику Канта. У 2023 році опубліковано його книжку «Кант. Революція мислення». Також М. Вілашек був співредактором таких відомих кантознавчих видань, як «Кант: Критика чистого розуму» у серії «Тлумачення класиків» (тт. 17/18, 1998) і «Лексикон Канта» (3 тт., 2015).

Маркус Вілашек люб’язно надав для українського перекладу низку своїх статей про Кантову філософію, які публікуватимуться в українських наукових часописах упродовж ювілейного року*.

[*Переклад виконано за виданням: Willaschek, M. (2005). Recht ohne Ethik? Kant über die Gründe, das Recht nicht zu brechen. In: Kant in Streit der Fakultäten. Hrsg. von V. Gerhardt (SS. 188-204). Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. Перекладач – Віталій Терлецький.]