DEFINITION AND CRITERIA OF HUMAN DEATH AS A BIOETHICAL PROBLEM
BIOETHICS
Keywords:
bioethics, death, brain death, cardiopulmonary criterion, integrated functioning, consciousnessAbstract
The article discusses the problem of defining human death (death of a person) and its criteria in the context of contemporary bioethical debates. It analyzes the main approaches to the theoretical justification of the criterion of human death as the complete and irreversible cessation of all brain function (“the whole brain criterion”), which since the 1970s has gained wide recognition and legal acceptance in most countries of the world, as well as the main critical arguments against this criterion. The analysis provides grounds for concluding that the justification of the whole-brain criterion of human death based on a purely biological definition of death as the irreversible cessation of the integrated functioning of the organism is refuted by weighty counterarguments, primarily counterexamples of the integrated functioning of the human organism with a “dead” brain. On the other hand, the justification based on the intuitively plausible identification of human death with irreversible loss of consciousness in all its forms (inability to experience anything), while supporting the adoption of the whole-brain criterion as a step in the right direction, as compared to the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion, leads to the conclusion that it is advisable to replace the whole-brain criterion with the criterion that more accurately corresponds to this identification—human death as the irreversible cessation of all brain functions responsible for conscious mental states (“the higher brain criterion”). Consideration of the main arguments of the supporters of this position, the objections raised against it, and the responses to these objections gives grounds for concluding that it adequately represents the most socially and ethically significant meanings associated with the concept of human (personal) death. At the same time, given the heated debate on this issue, it is reasonable to introduce a pluralistic practice whereby the death of persons whose conscientious (religious or philosophical) beliefs contradict the basic criterion established by law (applicable “by default”) can be determined according to the criteria that agree with these beliefs.
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