Naturalistic Philosophy of Economics

Authors

  • Tetiana Bilous Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University

Abstract

Features of modern naturalism in the philosophy of science have been analyzed on the example from naturalistic philosophy of economics. In section 1 the author discussed general issues about naturalism and sketched a general framework for thinking about naturalism that has common acceptance in the philosophy of science. In section 2 the author surveyed contemporary research in philosophy of economics which she sees as broadly naturalist in spirit. The main feature of naturalism in the philosophy of science is  that the final verdict in philosophical discussions about science is to make the actual practice of science. The author also demonstrates that there is no a single solution for familiar “normative problem”, various sophisticated arguments can be offered depending on the context of the problem discussion. The author is also advocating methodological naturalism in the philosophy of economics which allows philosophy to be based on descriptions of scientific practice but provides the opportunity for the critical evaluation of that practice in epistemological perspective.

Author Biography

Tetiana Bilous, Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University

PhD in philosophical sciences, associate professor at the department of philosophy and methodology of sciences, philosophical faculty

References

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Published

2017-04-04

How to Cite

Bilous, T. (2017). Naturalistic Philosophy of Economics. Filosofska Dumka, (2), 81–93. Retrieved from https://dumka.philosophy.ua/index.php/fd/article/view/15

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