Criticism, persuasion, relativism: challenging rationality

ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY

Keywords: criticism, relativism, persuasion, rationality, Wittgenstein

Abstract

Criticism in philosophy goes in accordance with general skeptical scientific attitude toward results of a research. The latter are to be achieved, presupposed, given as data and become to be verified or falsified, questioned by critique, analyzing etc. Criticism is improved mean to avoid persuasion and relativism, but (as selected sample versions of philosophical criticism will illustrate, in particular critical legacy of I. Kant, H. Putnam and L. Wittgenstein, especially via resolute interpretation of his views by J. Conant) all three methodological attitudes are mutually correlated, sometimes even viciously. Relativism appears to be less vicious, because it could be treated as performative: relativism is relative. Attention to performativity of relativism can provide for its contextual validity and relativity.

Author Biography

Anna Laktionova

Associate Professor, Doctor of Science (Philosophy), Department of Theoretical and Practical Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv.

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Published
2020-02-25
How to Cite
Laktionova, A. (2020). Criticism, persuasion, relativism: challenging rationality. Filosofska Dumka, (6), 96-104. https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2019.06.096