Will and Volition: Personal Conditions of Possibility of Being an Agent
ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2021.04.153Keywords:
will, volition, agency, rationality, normativityAbstract
Will is a very old important philosophical concept, an analysis of which is very specific, if not odd, comparatively with the others (when it fruitfully proceeds in terms of criteria). This concept (‘will’) is going to be used to provide and clarify conditions of possibility for person of being an agent. In doing that I refer to the correspondent pieces of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations; and to their interpretations by M. Alvarez in “Wittgenstein on Action and Will” (2009) and D. K. Levy in “Morality without Agency” (2017). Person is essentially constituted by ‘powerless’ will in terms of ‘understanding’ that is experienced during her life. Action depends on and manifests understanding by will of a personal attitude to some states of affairs. Will does not incline a person to particular desires about preferable states of affairs or actions. Will is not about states of affairs. By willing I value the world, its portions, they appear significant, important to me. Volition is treated as related to will. Both are personal conditions of being an agent with priority of agency as capacity realized by rational actions.
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