FROM A JUST WAR TO A JUST PEACE. MORAL PRINCIPLES AND LIMITS OF COMPROMISES IN WARTIMES

RETURN TO THE TOPIC: Philosophical Discourses of War

Abstract

The article’s reasoning is based on the definition of the nature of the war in Ukraine, which, following the Russian aggression on February 24, 2022, escalated into a full-scale conflict: this war has gradually acquired features of the total wars of the 20th century and transformed into a war of attrition, which could last for a considerable period of time. If such a war does not end with the capitulation of one of the parties, the most likely outcome would be a peace agreement involving third parties, which would take the form of a compromise and involve a renunciation by the participating parties of complete victory in the war.

Given the just nature of Ukraine's war against Russian aggression, the author raises the question of whether a peace can be considered just without a complete victory over the aggressor and without the full restoration of justice disrupted by the aggression. Drawing on the classical work of M. Walzer, the author concludes that renouncing complete victory and halting hostilities at a point when the conflict can be resolved through political means fully aligns with the concept of a just war as a limited war. To establish the moral principles and possible limits of compromises in wartime, the author turns to A. Margalit’s concept, which, in his view, continues Walzer’s reasoning by outlining the possibility of compromises for the sake of peace.

Drawing on contemporary research on political compromises, the author analyzes possible configurations of compromises in wartimes, their differences from political compromises in peacetime, and other potential outcomes of a war of attrition, including scenarios such as the capitulation of one of the parties or a modus vivendi. The article develops on the ideas of M. Walzer and A. Margalit, emphasizing that limiting the war and reaching a compromise for peace make necessary to clarify the requirements of justice. This, in turn, necessitates that the party engaged in a just war be guided by the ethics of responsibility when determining war aims, while also adhering to the fundamental distinction between good and evil in order to avoid "rotten" compromises.

This research was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, grant “Compromises in Wartime”; the author is also grateful to UNIL Professor Sandrine Baume for supporting his research in the field of political compromises